December 30, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
MISAEL BARRAGAN-SILVA, aka Misael Naranjo-Mora, Defendant.
Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney. Nirav K. Desai, Assistant United States Attorney. Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Shari Rusk, Esq. Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE:
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 7, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 21, 2014, and to exclude time between January 7, 2014, and January 21, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 100 pages of documents, primarily from the defendant's immigration file. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant was unexpectedly called away to attend to a family matter. Additionally, counsel for defendant desires additional time consult with her client regarding the pending charge in light of the discovery provided, conduct further investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. It would also deny the defendant continuity of counsel.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 7, 2014 to January 21, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.