ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
VICTOR B. KENTON, Magistrate Judge.
On December 31, 2013, Eric LaQuince Brown (hereinafter referred to "Petitioner") filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 ("Petition") in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The Petition is directed to a conviction for second degree robbery sustained in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on September 21, 2005. Petitioner was sentenced on December 7, 2005 to 16 years in state prison. (See Petition at 2.)
Petitioner appealed his conviction. On January 19, 2007, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's conviction. (Petition at 3.)
Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. (Petition at 3.)
Upon initial review, it appears that the Petition is time-barred. Since the Petition was filed after the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA") on April 24, 1996, the Court's consideration of the Petition's timeliness is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), as amended by the AEDPA. See Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (Beeler) , 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 and 523 U.S. 1061 (1998). That section provides:
"(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or,
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection."
Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the statute begins to run at the completion of direct review in the state courts. On September 21, 2005, Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal which was denied on January 19, 2007. Petition did not file a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. (See Petition at 3.) Thus, Petitioner's conviction became final on February 28, 2007, 40 days after the California Court of Appeal's decision. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 24(a), 28(b), 45(a).) Petitioner had until February 28, 2008, in which to timely file a federal habeas petition. Smith v. Duncan , 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, Petitioner filed his Petition on December 31, 2013. The Petition was filed approximately five years after the statute of limitations expired and is facially untimely, absent any statutory or equitable tolling.
The running of the AEDPA's one-year time limitation is tolled for the time period during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other state collateral review is pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2); Evans v. Chavis , 546 U.S. 189, 193-194 (2006). The statute is tolled from "the time the first state habeas was filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner's ...