January 9, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
JAMES RANDOLPH SHERMAN and LINDSEY MILLS, Defendants.
CANDACE A. FRY, CA Bar No. 68910 Sacramento, CA, Attorney for LINDSEY MILLS, Defendant.
CHARLES A. PACHECO, Attorney for JAMES R. SHERMAN, Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, through their respective counsel, as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 27, 2014, and to exclude time between January 9, 2014, and February 27, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate and request that the Court find the following:
a. The Government has represented that discovery associated with this case includes approximately 53 pages of documents plus audio and images. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. Additional discovery has been requested by the defendants and the Government is in the process of preparing same for production.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review new discovery when received from the Government and to discuss potential resolutions with the Government and their clients. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The Government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 9, 2014, through February 27, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) (Local Code T4) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.