MELINDA HAAG United States Attorney J. DOUGLAS WILSON Chief, Criminal Division DAMALI A. TAYLOR Assistant United States Attorney. San Francisco, California. Attorneys for United States of America.
JOHN FORSYTH Counsel for the Defendant.
STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER DOCUMENTING WAIVER OF TIME UNDER RULE 5.1 AND EXCLUSION OF TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE, Magistrate Judge.
The parties, Assistant United States Attorney Damali Taylor on behalf of the United States and John Forsyth, Esquire, on behalf of the defendant, GREGORY KITTLING, hereby request that the current January 17, 2014 date for preliminary hearing be continued until February 14, 2014 so that defense counsel and the government may review the voluminous discovery in this case. The parties further request that, given the need to gather and examine the discovery, time continue to be excluded under both Rule 5.1 and the Speedy Trial Act until February 14, 2014. Additional time is necessary to review the evidence and investigate the case, and that it is in the best interests of the defendant to do so before formal charges are filed. Furthermore, defense counsel is expected to be in trial on another matter during this time. The government agrees. To date, no time has elapsed under either Rule 5.1 or the Speedy Trial Act. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1, the Court would now be required to conduct a preliminary hearing on or before February 14, 2014, unless, inter alia, the defendant, who is in custody, waives the preliminary hearing or is indicted.
The parties agree that the ends of justice served by granting such an exclusion of time outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the date for preliminary hearing in this matter is re-set to February 14, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. unless, inter alia, the defendant, who is in custody, waives the preliminary hearing or is indicted. The Court finds that good cause is shown for extending the time limits set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(c), and, further, concludes that the extension is proper under Rule 5.1(d) and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3060 and 3161.
The Court finds that the failure to grant the requested extension would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested extension outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and in the prompt disposition of criminal cases. The Court also concludes that an exclusion of time through and including February 14, 2014, should be made under Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court also finds that the ends of justice ...