January 15, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
BENJAMIN CUNHA, Defendant.
LAW OFFICE OF JOHNNY L. GRIFFIN, III, JOHNNY L. GRIFFIN, III, (SBN: 118694), SACRAMENTO, CA, Attorney for Defendant, BENJAMIN CUNHA.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, Michael D. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 28, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 25, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between January 28, 2014 and March 25, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes seven DVDs containing 2527 pages of reports, documents and photographs. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. This discovery relates to conduct dating back to the year of 2007.
b) Counsel for defendant needs additional time for to further review discovery in this matter, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 28, 2014 to March 25, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.