United States District Court, S.D. California
MARK L. MATCHYNSKI, JR., Plaintiff,
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING; MATT YSBRAND; JENNIFER BOLTON; GMAC MORTGAGE; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM INC. (MERS); FANNIE MAE; ADVANTAGE TITLE, INC.; and PACIFIC CITY BANK, Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
[Docket Nos. 9, 11, 13]
ROGER T. BENITEZ, District Judge.
On August 19, 2013, Plaintiff Mark L. Matchynski commenced this action by filing a Complaint against the above-named defendants. Before this Court are three Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant Advantage Title, Inc. (Docket No. 9), Defendants Jennifer Bolton, Fannie Mae, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS), Ocwen Loan Servicing, and Matt Ysbrand (Docket No. 11), and by Defendant Pacific City Bank (Docket No. 13). For the reasons stated below, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and this Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
According to his Complaint, Plaintiff owns property in San Diego, California ("Subject Property"). He alleges that he tendered a promissory note to a corporate bank in exchange for a "bank check note." (Compl. ¶ 15). He states that he transferred all "ownership, equity, and rights" in the property to the "MM Balboa Arms Trust" on March 12, 2013, with Plaintiff as trustee. ( Id. ¶¶ 19-20).
Plaintiff states that on July 20, 2012, he sent an electronic funds transfer (EFT) instrument in the amount of $162, 771.74 and the mortgage payoff statement to Defendant GMAC Mortgage LLC (GMAC). ( Id. ¶ 21, 23). On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff was notified by GMAC employee Defendant Jennifer Bolton that the instrument was refused as an "Unacceptable Form of Payment." ( Id. ¶ 22). On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff informed Bolton that the instrument was lawful and proper, "so as to set-off and discharge the debt associated with this specific account." ( Id. ¶ 23). He states that the original instrument was not returned within the time and in the manner required, and therefore it has been accepted ( Id. ) On September 9, 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to GMAC stating that their responses were irrelevant and invalid, and asking for a copy of the agreement between Plaintiff and GMAC. ( Id. ¶ 26). On September 17, 2012, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Matt Ysbrand of GMAC, which stated that an EFT is not an acceptable form of payment, and that payment in the form of certified funds, such as a cashier's check or bank wire, is the only form of tender accepted for a full payoff of the debt. ( Id. ¶ 27). GMAC informed Plaintiff around January 2013 that the servicing rights had been transferred to Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing (Ocwen). ( Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff asked Ocwen to allow him to inspect the original promissory note to verify it was properly endorsed. ( Id. ¶ 29). In its response, Ocwen allegedly claimed to have enclosed the original note, and sent Plaintiff a copy of the original note. ( Id. ¶ 30). Plaintiff asserts that he believes the note was not produced because it was collateralized. ( Id. ¶ 31). He further states that this failure to produce the note violated the Uniform Commercial Code. ( Id. )
Plaintiff also states that a national bank has the power to lend money, but not its credit, and that there is no evidence here to support the fact that the banks lent money, and not credit. ( Id. ¶ 33).
Plaintiff also claims that legal tender for the discharge of a debt is not required, that payment cannot be demanded in a particular form of coin or currency or legal tender, and that repayment or payment need only be made in equivalent kind: a negotiable instrument. ( Id. ¶ 36). He states that GMAC demanded a specific form of payment, in violation of federal law and the Uniform Commercial Code. ( Id. ¶ 37).
Plaintiff states that Ocwen intended to deceive him by sending a copy of the original note. ( Id. ¶ 39). He then cites to a number of federal laws and regulations regarding copying securities and counterfeiting. ( Id. )
Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the Subject Property and asserts a fraud claim. Plaintiff has conceded that his third and fourth causes of action, which seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, are not independent causes of action. (Docket No. 16, at 2). He now appears to be asking this Court to grant this form of relief.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may grant a motion to dismiss if, taking all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (requiring plaintiff to plead factual content that provides "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully"). Under this standard, dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the matter complained of, or if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which relief may be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Plaintiff's causes of action refer generally to "Defendants, " and it is often ambiguous from the Complaint and the context which defendants are accused of which causes of action. It is also often unclear why each defendant has been accused of a particular cause of action. Plaintiff acknowledges this difficulty, and asks this Court to read his Complaint in light of his allegations, and to allow him leave to amend if necessary. (Docket Nos. 16, 18, 20). Given such confusion, amendment would be required to proceed.
However, Plaintiff articulates several general theories that he claims entitle him to relief. Upon full review of the Complaint, and taking into consideration the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding without legal training or experience in crafting pleadings, this Court concludes that the arguments ...