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Tollette v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

January 21, 2014

JEFFREY TOLLETTE, an individual, Plaintiff,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA; U S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT [Dkt. 11]

DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (the "Motion"). For the reasons stated in this order, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff Jeffrey Tollette ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendants JP Morgan Chase, N.A. and U.S. Bank, N.A.[1] ("Defendants"), alleging various causes of action relating to the foreclosure of the single family residence located at 926 W. Hillcrest Blvd., Monrovia, CA 91016 (the "Property"). (Complaint ¶ 6.)

On November 15, 2006, Plaintiff executed a promissory note in the amount of $855, 000 (the "Loan") on the Property. (Id. ¶ 12.) The original lender of the note was Fieldstone. (Id.) However, at some point Fieldstone transferred its assets, including the Loan, to EMC, a subsidiary of Bear Stearns. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that shortly after EMC obtained the Loan, it sold or transferred the Loan through a process known as "QSPE Bank Securitization." (Id. ¶ 14.)

On March 16, 2008, Defendant Chase acquired all of Bear Stearns' loans. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that this occurred after EMC transferred its interest in the Loan through the QSPE Bank Securitization. (Id. ¶ 16.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that Chase did not own the Loan at any time because EMC no longer owned the Loan when it transferred its loan interests to Chase. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.)

On or about February 14, 2008, "Defendant"[2] recorded a Notice of Default against the Property. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that he attempted on several occasions to obtain evidence from Chase that it was the holder in due course of the note on the Loan, but Plaintiff never received any validation that Chase was the holder. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff then mailed a "rescission letter regarding tender" and a Qualified Written Request to Chase. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.)

Chase purportedly sold the Property to U.S. Bank without a valid security interest in the Property on September 9, 2010. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff claims that this sale was therefore invalid. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Chase failed to properly consider a loan modification or other alternatives to foreclosure prior to foreclosing on the Property in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5.[3] (Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 32.)

Plaintiff alleges six causes of action arising out of these facts: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) negligence against Chase; (3) negligence against U.S. Bank; (4) fraud; (5) unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; and (6) quiet title. (Id. ¶¶ 28-54.) Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 11.)

II. Legal Standard

A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes , 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations, " it must offer "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely offers "labels and conclusions, " a "formulaic recitation of the elements, " or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their claims rise "above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679.

III. Discussion

A. Wrongful ...


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