January 22, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
JOSE ENRIQUE VELARDES ZAZEUTA, et al., Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney TODD A. PICKLES Assistant United States Attorney Sacramento, CA Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
VICTOR SHERMAN, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Jose Enrique Velardes Zazueta
TIMOTHY WARRINER, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Francisco Parra Arrellanez
DINA SANTOS, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Jovany Romo Arrellanes
RICKY POON, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Yu Nung Chen
RICHARD DUDEK, ESQ. Counsel for Defendant Efrain Padilla Pena
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Jose Enrique Velardes Zazueta, Francisco Parra Arrellanez, Jovany Romo Arrellanes, Yu Nung Chen, and Efrain Padilla Pena, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 24, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 21, 2014 and to exclude time between January 24, 2014 and March 21, 2014 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports produced to defendants numbering approximately 800 pages. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Further, the United States anticipates making a further production of documents and audio recordings, including intercepted communications, within the next few weeks which are anticipated to be voluminous.
c) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their client, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
d) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The United States does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 24, 2014 to March 21, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.