United States District Court, E.D. California
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874), ATTORNEY AT LAW Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant SCOTT CAVELL,
Benjamin B. Wagner United States Attorney.
PAUL A. HEMESATH Assistant U.S. Attorney.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on January 28, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 18, 2014 and to exclude time between January 28, 2014 and February 18, 2014 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 12, 000 pages of discovery.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. The Parties have spent considerable time negotiating this matter and believe resolution is imminent. The continuance requested herein will allow the defense to review the anticipated draft plea agreement; discuss the terms, conditions and consequences of the plea agreement and review relevant guideline issues. The Parties had hoped to have a final draft of the plea agreement ready in time to proceed on January 28, 2014, with the change of plea. The complex nature of the case and the schedule of the Parties prevented that from happening as hoped. The date request herein will allow the Parties time to complete the plea agreement and also takes into consideration my trial schedule. (US v. Albright et al 11-226 TLN. Trial is scheduled to start 2/3/14 and run 6-8 court days.)
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of January 28, 2014 to February 18, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ...