United States District Court, E.D. California
February 12, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
BRADLEY MCGRATH, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHAEL D. McCOY, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
TIM A. PORI, Counsel for Defendant Bradley McGrath.
AMENDED STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 6, 2014.
2. On February 4, 2014, the parties moved to continue the status conference until February 20, 2014, and to exclude time between February 6, 2014 and February 20, 2014, under Local Code T4. However, after filing the Stipulation and Proposed Findings and Order, the parties were informed that the Court would not be in session on February 20, 2014.
3. The Parties now file this Amended Stipulation and Proposed Order requesting to continue the status conference until March 6, 2014.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case has been either produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying.
b) The parties have been involved in plea negotiations, and the Government has extended a formal plea offer to the defendant. Defense counsel needs additional time to reevaluate the discovery previously provided by the Government, review the formal plea agreement with the defendant, and make recommendations to the defendant regarding acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the defendant decides to enter into the plea agreement, defense counsel will need additional time to prepare the defendant for a change of plea hearing.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 6, 2014 to March 6, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.