United States District Court, E.D. California
February 14, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
JOSE MARIA VILLAREAL, Defendant.
RICHARD J. BENDER, Assistant United States Attorney.
CHRIS COSCA (SBN 144546), LAW OFFICES OF CHRIS COSCA, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, JOSE MARIA VILLAREAL.
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America and defendant JOSE MARIA VILLAREAL, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on February 18, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to vacate this date and reset the status conference for February 25, 2014 at 9:45 a.m.
3. The parties further stipulate to exclude time between February 18, 2014 and February 25, 2014 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request. It is anticipated the defendant will be entering a change of plea at the next court appearance.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review and analyze discovery, to conduct additional investigation, to conduct necessary legal research, and to adequately advise defendant about immigration consequences, change of plea issues and potential sentencing matters. Discovery includes over 100 pages of written material as well as CD/DVDs with audio and video recordings.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant this request would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance and has authorized Chris Cosca to sign his name to this stipulation
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 18, 2014 to February 25, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), and Local Code T4, because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.