United States District Court, E.D. California
JOHN R. MANNING, (SBN 220874) ATTORNEY AT LAW, Sacramento, CA. Attorney for Defendant SCOTT CAVELL
PAUL A. HEMESATH, Assistant U.S. Attorney
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Scott Cavell, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on February 18, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 11, 2014 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between February 18, 2014 and March 11, 2014 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 12, 000 pages of discovery.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. The Parties have spent considerable time negotiating this matter and believe resolution is imminent. The continuance requested herein will allow the defense to review the anticipated draft plea agreement; discuss the terms, conditions and consequences of the plea agreement and review relevant guideline issues. The Parties have been working to complete a plea agreement and have a final draft of the plea agreement ready in time to proceed on February 18, 2014. The complex nature of the case and the schedule of the Parties prevented that from happening as hoped. Discussions and negotiations are ongoing and progress is being made. The defense submitted a offer to resolve and factual basis to the government. The government ultimately rejected both, but, in doing so, accepted some of the suggestions proffered by the defense. The Parties are now finalizing the plea agreement and factual basis.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of February 18, 2014 to March 11, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...