United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
February 19, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
KATHRYN DARLENE CORYELL, a/k/a Kathryn Darlene Leckbee, and Kat, Defendants.
MELINDA HAAG (CAB 132612), United States Attorney.
MIRANDA KANE (CAB 150630), Chief, Criminal Division.
CHARLES A. O'REILLY (CAB 160980), ERIN S. MELLEN (VAB 70319), SONIA M. OWENS, Trial Attorneys, San Francisco, California, Attorneys for the United States of America.
PAUL B. MELTZER, Counsel for Kathryn Darlene Coryell.
STIPULATION AND  ORDER CONTINUING HEARING DATE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
D. LOWELL JENSEN, District Judge.
The United States, represented by United States Attorney Melinda Haag, and by Trial Attorneys Charles A. O'Reilly, Sonia M. Owens and Erin S. Mellen, and the defendant, Kathryn Darlene Coryell, represented by Paul B. Meltzer, hereby stipulate that, with the Court's approval, the status conference currently set for Thursday, February 20, 2013 at 9:00 a.m., shall be continued to Thursday, April 3, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
The continuance is requested to provide both defense counsel and the government with additional time to review discovery and negotiate an appropriate resolution. The continuance would provide both parties with the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation. Accordingly, the parties respectfully request that status conference be continued to April 3, 2014, and that the time between February 20, 2014 and April 3, 2013 be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).
Pursuant to agreement and stipulation of the parties, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the time between February 20, 2014 and April 3, 2014 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161. The Court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), that the failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Furthermore, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. The Court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.