United States District Court, E.D. California
February 19, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
MARTIN ROJAS-CUAMBA, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney Fresno, CA Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
ROGER LITMAN Counsel for Defendant
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS; ORDER
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on March 11, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, the parties agree to vacate the trial date and continue the trial to October 15, 2014, or a date closer in time to the related matter United States v. Baltazar Rodriguez, et al., 1:12-CR-0318 LJO-SKO, currently set for trial November 18, 2014. A continuance is necessitated by the recent receipt of translated interviews of the Spanish-speaking defendant, who resides in San Diego County. Counsel for the parties believe that the agreed upon continuance will afford sufficient time for additional meetings and interviews with the assistance of an interpreter, which counsel anticipate may trigger 5K1.1 in this and, potentially, the related matter. In addition, the translated interviews obtained by the defense brought to defense counsel's attention an important area of investigation which could be exculpatory in nature, providing a defense. As a result, defense counsel will be submitting additional investigative requests but anticipates some delay in obtaining records from the State of California. Also, scheduling the trials of Defendants Rojas-Cuamba and Baltazar Rodriguez closer in time will conserve government's resources and efforts, given the fact that many of the same witnesses will be required for both trials.
3. The defendant, who is out of custody on pretrial release and employed on a full-time basis, specifically agrees to the continuance and exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the parties believe that granting of the above-requested continuance is in the interest of justice and would afford defense counsel the opportunity to fully develop any defense that Mr. Rojas-Cuamba may have to the charged offenses or, alternatively, to permit a resolution that is in Mr. Rojas-Cuamba's best interest.
b. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
c. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 11, 2014, to October 15, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv), because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.