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United States v. Velasco

United States District Court, E.D. California

February 25, 2014

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCISCO VELASCO, Defendant.

Dina L. Santos, A Professional Law Corp., Attorneys for FRANCISCO VELASCO

BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney.

JARED DOLAN, Assistant United States Attorney.

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 3/20/14

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 27, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 20, 2014, and to exclude time between February 27, 2013, and March 20, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) Counsel for defendants desires additional time to consult with her client, continue to review the voluminous discovery, conduct investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance and needs time to evaluate information that has been provided by the defense.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 27, 2014, to March 20, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.


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