United States District Court, N.D. California
February 27, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
HOWARD WEBBER, Defendant.
STEVEN G. KALAR, Federal Public Defender, ELIZABETH M. FALK Assistant Federal Public Defender, San Francisco, CA, CYNTHIA STIER Assistant United States Attorney Counsel for Defendant WEBBER.
STIPULATION and [PROPOSED] ORDER TO ALTER BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL MOTIONS
RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.
Undersigned counsel stipulate as follows:
1. Defense counsel needs additional time to research and present the motion to dismiss currently scheduled for hearing on March 18, 2014, due to unexpected unavailability;
2. The government has no opposition to the request for additional time;
3. Accordingly, the parties stipulate that the briefing schedule for defendant's pretrial motions should be continued by two weeks, as follows:
4. Opening Brief Due: March 11, 2014
5. Response Due: March 25, 2014
6. Replies Due: April 1, 2014
7. Hearing: April 9, 2014 at 2:30 p.m.
8. The parties further agree that the hearing date of March 18, 2014 shall be moved to April 9, 2014 at 2:30 p.m.
9. The parties also submit and agree that an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act is needed for the entire period of time between today February 26, 2014 and March 11, 2014. The parties agree that the ends of justice served by granting such an exclusion of time for the purposes of effective preparation of counsel outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, it is hereby ORDERED that the briefing schedule suggested by the parties in the aforementioned stipulation is hereby adopted by this Court. The hearing date of March 18, 2014 shall be moved to April 9, 2014 at 2:30p.m. The Court further finds that the exclusion from the time limits of this period applicable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 is warranted and that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Denying the requested exclusion of time would deprive the defendant effective preparation of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.