United States District Court, E.D. California
March 3, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
LAREDO et al., Defendant.
TONI H. CARBONE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Auburn, CA, Attorney for Defendant ANGELA BOSCHKE.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JUSTIN L. LEE, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for the United States.
CLEMENTE JIMENEZ, for Defendant Bernardo Laredo.
STIPULATIONAND [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER CONTINUING CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
Defendant, ANGELA BOSCHKE, by and through her counsel of record, TONI CARBONE, BERNARDO LAREDO, by and through his counsel, CLEMENTE JIMENEZ, and the GOVERNMENT hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for Change of Plea Hearing on March 3, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the Change of Plea Hearing from March 3, 2014 until March 31, 2014, and to exclude time between March 3, 2014 and March 31, 2014 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendants desires additional time to review discovery, discuss potential resolutions with the defendants, and investigate and research issues related to sentencing mitigation. Counsels for the defendant and for the Government are in active discussions related to issues surrounding resolution and sentencing mitigation and progress is being made.
b. Counsels for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The Government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 3, 2014 to March 31, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.