United States District Court, E.D. California
March 4, 2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
JOSE JAIME DIAZ, ET AL., Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
DANNY BRACE, Counsel for Defendant Emilio Marquez Barba
KATHERINE E. LATHROP, Counsel for Defendant Mario Lopez-Ayala
DUSTIN JOHNSON, Counsel for Defendant Gabriel Vargas-Guerrero
CLEMENTE JIMENEZ, Counsel for Defendant Jose Jaime Diaz
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 6, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 10, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between March 6, 2014, and April 10, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 700 pages of documents and photographs, including investigative reports. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time consult with their clients, conduct investigation and research, review discovery, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 6, 2014 to April 10, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED