United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS SUCCESSIVE (DOC. 1), DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECT THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: THIRTY (30) DAYS
BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, District Judge.
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on February 7, 2014, and transferred to this Court on February 18, 2014. On February 20, 2014, the Court directed Petitioner to submit a verification and signature of the petition. On March 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a verification form and signature in response to the Court's order.
I. Screening the Petition
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court...." Habeas Rule 4; O'Bremski v. Maass , 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez , 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O'Bremski v. Maass , 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez , 908 F.2d at 491.
Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook , 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson , 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).
Petitioner alleges that he is serving a sentence imposed in the Kern County Superior Court in 1997 for murder and attempted murder with great bodily injury and firearm enhancements. (Pet., doc. 1, 1.) In the petition, Petitioner challenges his convictions, alleging that he suffered violations of his constitutional rights in the course of the trial and appellate proceedings related to his commitment offenses.
However, the present petition is not the first petition filed with respect to the judgment pursuant to which Petitioner is detained. The Court may take judicial notice of court records. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso , 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D.Cal. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court will take judicial notice of its own dockets.
In Jerome Lamar Gentery v. Cheryl Pliler, case number 1:99-cv-06414-AWI-HGB, on May 9, 2000, the Court denied on the merits Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus that challenged the same judgment of the Kern County Superior Court. (Doc. 11, filed March 22, 2000, at 1-11; docs. 17 & 18, filed May 8, 2000 and May 9, 2000.) Petitioner filed an appeal from the judgment, but the Court declined to issue a certificate of appealability (doc. 20, filed June 5, 2000), and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals thereafter declined to authorize a successive petition (doc. 29, filed March 31, 2005).
III. Successive Petition
Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Furman v. Wood , 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). Under the AEDPA, a federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The Court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground concerning the same judgment unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and the new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets these requirements, which allow a petition to file a second or successive petition. Section 2244(b))3)(A) provides, "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, a petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he or she can file a second or successive petition in the district court. See, Felker v. Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1996). This Court must dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application unless the Court of Appeals has given ...