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Willis v. Beard

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 14, 2014

LEROY WILLIS II, Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, et al., Defendants.

ORDER

ALLISON CLAIRE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner housed in Los Angeles County and proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Northern District on November 20, 2013. ECF No. 1. The case was transferred in to the Eastern District on February 27, 2014. ECF No. 10. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff's consent to the jurisdiction of the undersigned was filed on March 17, 2014. ECF No. 13.

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious, " that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy , 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona , 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin , 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more... than... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-35 (3d ed. 2004). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees , 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen , 395 U.S. 411, 421(1969).

Plaintiff names six defendants in his case caption: Jeffrey Beard, CDCR[1] Secretary; Warden Brian Duffy; Sergeant Spencer and C/O (Correctional Officer) Ornales identified as ISU-CMF[2]; J.D. Lozano, Chief of [Inmate] Appeals and D. Artis, CMF Appeal Examiner. However, in his abbreviated allegations, plaintiff broadly alleges that "all six defendants" on or about September 25, 2012 were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's [right] to be "free from torture and cruel and unusual punishment" when he was placed in administrative segregation ("Ad Seg") based on a serious rules violation report ("RVR") for a violation he contends he did not commit. Plaintiff claims that the RVR was premised "on conjecture and a[n] unlicensed handwriting expert alleged by C/O Spencer[, ] et al. [sic]." Plaintiff alleges he was kept in Ad Seg for an entire year, but also asserts that he was released from Ad Seg on December 25, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that his earliest possible release date was extended because of the deliberate indifference of the defendants. As relief, plaintiff seeks one million two hundred thousand dollars in compensatory damages. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages as well as an injunctive relief in the form of having his March 24, 2015 early release date (by which he means his minimum eligible parole release date) restored. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 3.

Plaintiff references only one defendant, Spencer, by name in the body of the complaint. Plaintiff fails to articulate a coherent claim against Spencer. Plaintiff also asserts he was held in Ad Seg for a year but provides dates indicating he was released from Ad Seg after three months. Plaintiff's vague, conclusory and generalized allegations fail altogether to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires "sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v. Block , 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202 (2d ed. 1990)). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must provide fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency , 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). "Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim." Id . (internal citation/quotation marks omitted). Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

In addition, as to all defendants except Spencer, plaintiff makes no specific allegations. Plaintiff is informed that the Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law]... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode , 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "A person subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy , 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, as to defendants Secretary Beard and Warden Duffy, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley , 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld , 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the ...


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