United States District Court, E.D. California
CHARLES F. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff,
JOHN DOE, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF No. 1)
STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Charles F. Robertson is a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint, filed March 14, 2014. (ECF No. 1.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious, " that "fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, " or that "seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams , 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman , 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service , 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678; Moss , 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff alleges that the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Warden of Avenal State Prison ("ASP"), Chief Medical Officer of ASP, and Classification Staff Representative at Folsom State Prison, either directly or indirectly, allowed him to be exposed to Valley Fever in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.)
Under section 1983, Plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles , 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones , 297 F.3d at 934. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and therefore, each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 676. In other words, to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights.
In this instance, Plaintiff has not linked the defendants named in his complaint to any acts or omissions that purportedly led to the violation of his constitutional rights. General assertions that there was an act or failure to act do not suffice to show that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by these Defendants. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79. It appears that for some of the defendants that Plaintiff is attempting to impose liability, not on Defendants' personal involvement, but because they hold positions of authority which does not provide a basis for liability under section 1983. Iqbal at 677 ("Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct."); Jones , 297 F.3d at 934.
Further, to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner's claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) "the prison official deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, '" and (2) "the prison official acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.'" Toguchi v. Chung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan , 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). In order to find a prison official liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement within a prison, the official must know "that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
While Plaintiff alleges that he contracted Valley Fever, not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a constitutional violation. Morgan v. Morgensen , 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). In order to state a claim in this instance, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he was at a substantial risk of harm. The mere existence of coccidioidomycosis spores in the soil around ASP is not sufficient to support a claim of unconstitutionally grave conditions of confinement. Further, ...