United States District Court, S.D. California
June 13, 2014
STEVEN HASTY, an individual, and KAREN HASTY, an individual, Plaintiffs,
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC., MARIN CONVEYANCING CORPORATION; et al., Defendants.
(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (2) REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT
[Docket No. 6]
ROGER T. BENITEZ, District Court Judge.
Presently before the Court is Defendants GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. and Marin Conveyancing Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 6.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED and this action is REMANDED to state court.
This mortgage foreclosure action was originally filed in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego. The Complaint alleged: (1) lack of standing to foreclose; (2) fraud in the concealment; (3) fraud in the inducement; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) quiet title; (6) slander of title; (7) declaratory relief; (8) violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et. seq. ; (9) violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601; (10) recission; and (11) injunctive relief. On January 27, 2014, GreenPoint and Marin Conveyancing removed the action based on federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal at 2.) Presently before this Court is Defendants GreenPoint and Marin Conveyancing's Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants move to dismiss all claims. Plaintiffs concede that their two federal claims - violation of TILA and violation of RESPA - are insufficiently pled. Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED.
The remainder of Plaintiffs' claims are state law claims. Because the Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action, the Court has discretion over whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
"[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
Because the two federal claims have been dismissed, the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. In addition, the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh toward declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, as this action is in its infancy. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The claims arising under federal law are DISMISSED. This action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego.
IT IS SO ORDERED.