United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF EITHER TO FILE A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT OR TO NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIM IDENTIFIED HEREIN
STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Craig Reed is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's second amended complaint, filed March 5, 2014.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious, " that "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, " or that "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz. , 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman , 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv. , 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678; Moss , 572 F.3d at 969.
II. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names Sergeant S. Hinshaw. Lieutenant B. Odle, Lieutenant J. Gallagher, and officer H. Johnson as Defendants in this action.
Plaintiff is physically disabled and requires the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiff contends that retaliatory acts coupled with constant civil rights violations took place by defendants over a period of twenty-three months as a result of Plaintiff and his family filing complaints against the defendants for their misconduct. Plaintiff sets forth his allegations in chronological order beginning on October 8, 2004, through February 15, 2006. The Court will briefly summarize Plaintiff's general complaints and will analyze the cognizability of such claims in the sections below.
On October 8, 2004, Plaintiff requested to speak to a control booth officer regarding the failure to acknowledge his ADA medical shower chrono.
On October 10, 2004, Plaintiff was summoned to the program office to see Sergeant Curtiss and officer Boncore. Sergeant Curtiss threatened to issue a counseling chrono against Plaintiff if he and his family did not stop their complaints.
On October 11, 2004, Plaintiff filed an ADA medical accommodation appeal. On October 16, 2004, Sergeant Curtiss had Plaintiff moved out of his ADA cell into a segregated housing unit in order to discourage him from seeking further redress through the grievance system. On this same day, Plaintiff filed a grievance against officer Boncore for the failure to comply with his ADA medical chrono. Officer Boncore started a rumor among prison inmates and staff that the reason Plaintiff left the building so abruptly was because he was a rat and snitch which placed Plaintiff's safety and liberty at risk. The allegations by Sergeant Curtiss and officer Boncore were a direct result of Plaintiff filing an ADA medical appeal.
On November 4, 2004, Sergeant J. Gallagher investigated the ADA medical appeal and entered invalid information in the record. On November 10, 2004, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Sergeant Curtiss and officers Padilla and Boncore for the continuous harassment and retaliation.
On December 8, 2004, acting appeals coordinator, S. Smith, screened out Plaintiff's grievance filed against officer Boncore on October 16, 2004, for spreading rumors in an effort to induce an assault against Plaintiff.
On December 12, 2004, Sergeant Hinshaw denied Plaintiff's grievance against Sergeant Curtiss and officers Padilla and Boncore. On the next day, out of retaliatory animus Plaintiff was again moved from his ADA cell to a segregated housing unit. Plaintiff contends the move was another tactic to discourage the filing of future grievances.
On December 14, 2004, Plaintiff was issued two counseling chronos by officer J. Torres which ultimately resulted in issuance of a serious rules violation report. On this same day, Plaintiff filed a grievance against officer Torres.
On January 1, 2005, Sergeant Hinshaw was assigned to investigate and respond to Plaintiff's staff complaint against officer Torres which had been mis-categorized as a disciplinary issue. Sergeant Hinshaw dismissed the action and never addressed the threats and actions of officer J. Torres.
On January 14, 2005, Plaintiff's staff complaint against Lieutenant Gallagher for falsifying his appeal was screened out by S. Smith.
On January 22, 2005, officer H. Johnson filed a false rules violation report which placed Plaintiff's life in danger because he started a rumor that he was a child molester. Officer Johnson also issued a false rules violation report in ...