United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO FILE MEMORANDUM DEMONSTRATING WHY THEIR COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs Edison Cortez and Severina Cortez ("Plaintiffs") filed the complaint in this action on July 8, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state any federal claims and the Court lacks jurisdiction over any other state law claims raised by Plaintiffs.
SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND LACK OF JURISDICTION
District courts may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the Court gives notice of its intention to dismiss and afford plaintiffs an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 683 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. , 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); Wong v. Bell , 642 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1981)). Moreover, district courts have authority to dismiss actions sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction. Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Division , 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981). "[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit" and are "obviously frivolous." Hagans v. Lavine , 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se in this action. Although unclear, it appears that their complaint purports to assert causes of action under California Civil Code § 2924 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Plaintiff also alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 1343. Plaintiffs name Ric Juarez, Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP, and Wells Fargo, N.A. as defendants. The caption of the Complaint also lists Orchard Terrace Estates, LLC as a "Third-Party Defendant, " but it is unclear what Plaintiffs intended is using this designation.
Plaintiffs' complaint appears to allege some form of wrongful foreclosure. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants foreclosed upon Plaintiffs' home "using the fraudulent forged, fabricated Substitution of Trustee." (Compl. 2.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Ric Juarez "pretended to be the Assistant Vice President'/Foreclosure Operation of Wells Fargo" and had "no right to execute or sign the fabricated document, (Substitution of Trustee)." (Compl. 2.) Plaintiffs further allege that Juarez "pretended to be the Associate Director' of BARRETT DAFFINE FRAPPIER & WEISS, LLP as Trustee, while he never had been associated with this firm." (Compl. 2-3.) Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants "have lack of standing to foreclose on the subject property, as they are not the Note holders of the subject property." (Compl. 3.) Plaintiffs contend that "[a]ny assignment of Deed of Trust between the original lenders is voided because it violated the Trust agreement by exceeding the limitations of the required 90 day closing." (Compl. 4 (emphasis in original).)
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 1341, and 1343 Claims
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 1341, and 1343. However, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a federal criminal statute that punishes fraudulent statements made in the context of a matter within the executive, legislative, or judicial branches. Plaintiffs may have alleged that Defendants made fraudulent statements, but Plaintiffs have not alleged that those fraudulent statements were made in the context of a matter before the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the federal government. Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not provide for an express or implied right of action, meaning Plaintiff has no authority to initiate a civil lawsuit for damages based upon a violation of Section 1001. See Rundgren v. Bank of New York Mellon , 777 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1233 (D. Haw. 2011) (and cases cited therein); Dowdell v. Sacramento Housing & Redevelopment Agency, No. 2:11-cv-00409 JAM KJN PS, 2011 WL 837046, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (and cases cited therein).
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 1343 are criminal statutes prohibiting mail or wire fraud. See Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp. , 358 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. McNeil , 320 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff alleges no facts involving the use of the United States mail or wire to further a scheme to defraud. Moreover, neither Section 1341 nor Section 1343 authorizes a private right of action. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A. , 815 F.2d 522, 533 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff , 167 F.3d 402, 407-409 (8th Cir. 1999); Idowu v. Astheimer, No. C ...