United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; ORDER OF SERVICE AND DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE THAT SUCH MOTION IS UNWARRANTED
PAUL S. GREWAL, Magistrate Judge.
Michael Izell Seals-Brown, a California state parolee proceeding pro se, filed a second amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, the court dismisses several defendants, and serves the second amended complaint on the remaining defendants.
A. Standard of Review
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
B. Plaintiff's Claims
In Seals-Brown's second amended complaint, he states that he was convicted in 2001 of two counts of the misdemeanor of sexual battery,  and sentenced to a term of one year. Then, in 2003, Seals-Brown was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and other related offenses. This arrest was a violation of Seals-Brown's parole status. From the 2003 arrest, Seals-Brown was found guilty and sentenced to a term of twelve years. After Seals-Brown served his time and was released from prison, a condition of his parole was to register as a sex offender for life, based on his 2001 misdemeanor convictions. That condition of parole is the subject of Seals-Brown's underlying civil rights action.
Liberally construed, Seals-Brown states a cognizable claim against Parole Agent Jeffrey Llopis, Detective Noble Waidelich, Chief Andrew Mills, and Parole Agent Supervisor McNunn that enforcement of the sex offender registration condition of his parole violates due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment.
To the extent Seals-Brown is attempting to challenge the constitutionality of his arrest leading up to his 2001 convictions, those claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey  because judgment in favor of Seals-Brown would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Defendants Attorney General Kamala Harris and Warden G.D. Lewis are accordingly DISMISSED with prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby orders as follows:
1. Defendants Attorney General Kamala Harris and Warden G.D. Lewis are DISMISSED.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the second amended complaint and all attachments thereto (Docket No. 14), a magistrate judge jurisdiction consent form, and a copy of this order to Parole Agent Jeffrey Llopis and Supervisor Parole Agent McNunn at the CDCR Division of Parole Operations, Ukiah Unit, 798 North State Street, Ukiah, CA; and ...