United States District Court, E.D. California
SCOTT N. JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
BALBIR S. DHAMI, ET AL., Defendant.
ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
ALLISON CLAIRE, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the court is plaintiff's July 21, 2014, motion for default judgment against defendant Sahota Truck Plaza, located at 7891 Stockton Blvd., Sacramento, California 95823. ECF No. 9 at 2. The court has determined that the matter shall be submitted upon the record and briefs on file and accordingly, the date for hearing of this matter shall be vacated. E.D. Cal. R. 78-230(g). Upon review of the docket, the motion for default judgment and all attached exhibits, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 9, 2014 alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. § 54-54.8, and negligence. A certificate of service filed May 20, 2014, demonstrates that the summons and complaint were served on this defendant on May 14, 2014 by personal service to Jasreet K. Sahota, the designated agent for service of process at 9544 Wadena Way, Elk Grove, California 95758. ECF No. 4 at 1. Sahota Truck Plaza has not answered or otherwise appeared. On July 8, 2014, at plaintiff's request, the Clerk entered default as to Sahota Truck Plaza. ECF No. 6. On July 21, 2014, plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment, and served a copy of the motion by mail on the defendant at 9544 Wadena Way, Elk Grove, California 95758. ECF No. 9.
It is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny an application for default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe , 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
Eitel v. McCool , 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). "In applying this discretionary standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied." Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc. , 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc. , 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999)).
As a general rule, once default is entered, the factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. Tele Video Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal , 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, although well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are admitted by defendant's failure to respond, "necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default." Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Discrimination includes "a failure to remove architectural barriers... in existing facilities... where such removal is readily achievable." Id . § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Under the ADA, the term readily achievable means "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
"To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability." Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. , 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, "[t]o succeed on a ADA claim of discrimination on account of one's disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant's place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable." Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest. , 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000).
Here, plaintiff alleges (1) that he is disabled, Compl. ¶ 1; (2) that defendant Sahota Truck Plaza is a place of public accommodation, id. ¶ 7; (3) that plaintiff was denied access to defendant's business because of plaintiff's disability, id. ¶ 20; and (4) that defendant's business has a number of architectural barriers (lack of correct number and type of properly configured disabled parking space(s) including a space with an access aisle, accessible route, accessible entrance, accessible path of travel inside the business, and accessible restrooms), id. ¶ 9-19. Plaintiff argues that whether the removal of these barriers is readily achievable is an affirmative defense that is waived if not raised. ECF No. 9 at 6-7 (citing Wilson v. Haria and Gorgi Corp. , 479 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133 & n.7 (E.D. Cal. 2007)). The Court finds that it does not need to address the issue of whether the "ready achievability" of the barriers constitutes an affirmative defense. Regardless, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) specifically lists "[c]reating designated accessible parking spaces... [w]idening doors... [and] installing grab bars in toilet stalls" as examples of typical "steps to remove barriers." This means that the barriers cited by plaintiff are per se readily achievable and plaintiff has therefore met his burden.
Because plaintiff's allegations are taken as true on default, the court finds that plaintiff has made out a prima facie Title III discrimination claim. Additionally, the court finds that the majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment to plaintiff on that claim. Therefore, the court recommends that plaintiff be granted default judgment against defendant on his ADA claim and award plaintiff an injunction requiring defendant to provide the correct number and type of properly configured disabled parking space(s) including a van accessible disabled parking space, an accessible entrance landing, an accessible entrance, and accessible restrooms in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities ...