United States District Court, S.D. California
JAMES E. ROJO, CDCR #J-53355, Plaintiff,
D. PARAMO, Warden; A. HERNANDEZ, Deputy Warden; Mr. BEARD, Secretary CDCR; JONES, Correctional Officer; SMITH, Correctional Officer; Dr. M. GARIKAPARTHI, Defendants.
ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, DENYING RECONSIDERATION AND
DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B)(II) AND § 1915A(B)(1) (ECF DOC. NO. 22)
LARRY ALAN BURNS, District Judge.
I. Procedural History
On May 8, 2013, James E. Rojo ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of California.
On September 17, 2013, United States District Judge William H. Orrick determined that Plaintiff's claims arose at RJD; therefore, venue was proper in the Southern District of California and the matter was transferred here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(d), 1391(b) and 1406(a) (ECF Doc. No. 8). Judge Orrick did not rule on Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), nor did he screen Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A prior to transfer.
On October 25, 2013, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP, but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) (ECF Doc. No. 11). Specifically, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against RJD on Eleventh Amendment grounds, id. at 5, dismissed his claims against the Director/Secretary of the CDCR and RJD Wardens Paramo and Hernandez because Plaintiff failed to allege any individualized wrongdoing on their parts, id. at 5-6, dismissed his allegations of verbal harassment on the part of Correctional Officers Smith and Jones because he failed to allege facts which might give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, id. at 6, and dismissed Plaintiff's vague mention of "being denied medical treatment" and deprived of his property because his Complaint contained only "naked assertions" and no "further factual enhancement" sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies identified in the Court's Order. Id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (ECF Doc. No. 13), but it too was dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) (ECF Doc. No. 14). Because Plaintiff's FAC continued to name RJD, its Wardens, and the Secretary of the CDCR as Defendants, and continued to suffer from the same pleading problems noted in the Court's October 25, 2013 Order, it was dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 7. To the extent Plaintiff appeared, for the first time, to specifically challenge the validity of a three-month stint in Administrative Segregation, however, he was advised of the pleading requirements necessary to show a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995), and provided another opportunity to amend. Id. at 5-7.
On May 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (ECF Doc. No. 15), which re-named all previously named parties except RJD, and added an additional defendant, Dr. M. Garikaparthi. See SAC at 1, 2. Two weeks later, on May 30, 2014, Plaintiff also submitted a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF Doc. No. 20).
On June 10, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, screened his Second Amended Complaint, and dismissed it in its entirety for continuing to fail to state any claim upon which § 1983 relief could be granted against any named Defendant. See June 10, 2014 Order (ECF Doc. No. 21). Specifically, the Court dismissed all claims previously alleged against R.J. Donovan State Prison, D. Paramo, Warden, A. or Alan Hernandez, Deputy Warden, J. Beard, Director/Secretary of the CDCR, D. Jones, and D. Smith, Correctional Officers, and Plaintiff's inadequate medical treatment claims against Dr. M. Garikaparthi without further leave to amend. Id. at 11-12. Because Plaintiff had not been previously apprised of his deficiencies of pleading regarding one newly added claim of retaliation against Defendant Garikaparthi, however, the Court granted Plaintiff "one final opportunity to amend this claim against this Defendant only." Id. at 9-10 (emphasis original). Plaintiff was ordered not to "include any additional claims against Garikaparthi or any other party, " denied leave to add any new parties, and cautioned that his failure "to adhere to the directions set forth in [the Court's] Order, " would result in dismissal of the entire action without further leave to amend for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Id. at 12.
In response, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Respond to Order of 6-10-14 Third Amended Complain[t] and Objections to the Courts Order" which the Court will liberally construe as both a request for reconsideration of the Court's June 10, 2014 Order as well as his Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") (ECF Doc. No. 22).
II. "Objections" and Reconsideration
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration, the Court may reconsider matters previously decided under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). In Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that a ruling may be re-considered under Rule 59(e) motion where it involves "matters properly encompassed in a [previous] decision on the merits.'" 489 U.S. at 174 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employ't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). Reconsideration is generally appropriate only if the district court "(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff appears to object to the Court's prior Orders finding he failed to state a claim against Warden Paramo and Deputy Warden Hernandez on grounds that they "were aware that plaintiff was not guilty of the charges that put him into Administrative Segregation." See TAC at 1-2. He further seeks to "submit documentation" to show that Officers Smith and Jones "acted under color of state authority" and "tr[ied] to have inmates attack [him]." Id. at 2-3. Finally, Plaintiff claims he continues to suffer from various medical ailments for which Dr. Garikaparthi "has failed to administer the necessary medical... care." Id. at 4. As noted above, however, the Court has already twice considered and dismissed due process claims related to Plaintiff's segregation, and all his Eighth Amendment claims, only after apprising him of his pleadings deficiencies and giving him ample opportunity to correct them. See Oct. 25, 2014 Order (ECF Doc. No. 11); April 23, 2014 Order (ECF Doc. No. 14). It was only after Plaintiff failed for a third time to plead a claim to relief as to any of these allegations that was "plausible on its face, " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), that the Court denied him further leave to amend. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that district court's discretion in denying amendment is "particularly broad' when it has previously given leave to amend.") (citation omitted).
The objections Plaintiff's raises in his TAC offer no "further factual enhancement" sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. And while the Court has continually construed all of Plaintiff's pleadings liberally and in the light most favorable to him, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010), it simply may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Thus, because Plaintiff's has failed to present the Court with any with newly discovered evidence, has identified no clear error, demonstrated no manifest injustice, and has pointed to no intervening change in controlling law, see School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263, his ...