United States District Court, E.D. California
Archie Cranford, Plaintiff, Pro se, Coalinga, CA.
ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (ECF No. 15), AND (2) DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM TO TERMINATE MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE
Michael J. Seng, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 11.) No other parties have appeared in the action.
The Court screened Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) and dismissed it for failure to state a claim, but gave leave to amend. (ECF No. 10.) The Court then dismissed Plaintiff's first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, but gave leave to amend. His second amended complaint is before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 16.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for discovery. (ECF No. 15.)
I. MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
Plaintiff's motion for discovery cites various rules regarding the computation of time, but otherwise is incomprehensible. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff appears to argue that his complaint is ready for service because it was filed two and a half years ago. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff is incorrect. His initial complaint was filed on July 21, 2014 and, in any event, his second amended complaint has not yet been screened. Unless and until the Court finds plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim and authorizes him to proceed with it and serve it upon defendants and defendants answer, no discovery will be authorized.
Accordingly, his motion for discovery will be denied.
II. THE COMPLAINT
A. Screening Requirement
The in forma pauperis statute provides, " Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Pleading Standard
Section 1983 " provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain " a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but " [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth " sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere ...