United States District Court, N.D. California
George August-Bjurberg, Plaintiff, Pro se, Redwood City, CA.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; DENYING MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TO APPOINT COUNSEL
VINCE CHHABRIA, United States District Judge.
Re: Dkt. Nos. 3, 4
Plaintiff George August-Bjurberg,  incarcerated at the Maguire Correctional Facility, also known as the main jail in Redwood City, filed pro se several documents alleging constitutional violations by officers at the jail. August-Bjurberg also filed two documents entitled motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (" IFP").
The Clerk of the Court sent August-Bjurberg three notices to file a complaint on the Court's civil rights complaint application and to file a completed IFP application. August-Bjurberg submitted other filings, but he has not filed a complaint on the Court's complaint form. On October 8, 2014, August-Bjurberg filed a second motion to proceed IFP in which he states that no jail official will sign documents relating to his trust fund and he states that he is destitute. In a separate order, the Court grants August-Bjurberg's motions to proceed IFP but, if the defendants are served, they may file a motion to revoke his IFP status.
The Court will review the filings August-Bjurberg has submitted to determine if he is able to allege a cognizable claim.
I. Standard of Review
A federal court must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, to dismiss any claims that: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant's actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or fails to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633.
But there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. That is, a supervisor is not liable merely because the supervisor is responsible, in general terms, for the actions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may be liable only on a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). It is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege generally that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation or that they generally created policies and procedures that led to the ...