United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF CURRENT JUDGE AND REASSIGNMENT TO A DIFFERENT JUDGE 
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, District Judge.
On September 12, 2014 Plaintiff filed suit against Nike, Inc., asserting causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations, unfair competition and trade practices, commercial misappropriation, intentional interference with contractual relations, negligence and invasion of privacy. The complaint seeks 98.6 million dollars in compensatory damages.
On October 2, 2014, prior to Nike filing a responsive pleading, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.  On October 7, 2014 Nike, Inc. Filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6).  On October 8, 2014 Plaintiff sought entry of default against Nike, Inc. on the grounds that service of a responsive pleading was sent to plaintiff's counsel at the address reflected on the face of the complaint and not plaintiff's registered agent for service of process in the U.S. Virgin Islands.  Even more curious was the fact that the proof of service for the motion for default shows service upon defendant at least four days before a responsive pleading was due.  That motion, as well as plaintiff's request for writ of attachment and writ of execution were stricken by court order on October 15, 2014. .
On November 5, 2014 the court denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's motion was not supported by evidence either essential to establishing elements of the causes of action or showing a lack of genuine dispute of material fact. 
On November 19, 2014 the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend.  This was followed by Nike's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to California Civil Code 3344.  The same day, Plaintiff filed his one paragraph opposition to the motion.  That motion was set to be heard on January 5, 2015. For all practical purposes, this file was then closed and the docket so reflects.
Yet, plaintiff was undeterred. On December 4, 2014 plaintiff filed a "motion for case to be reopened" which strangely begins with the heading "Request for Entry of Default Judgment and Contempt of Court." In any event, Plaintiff asserts that the case should be reopened and the motion to dismiss reconsidered on the basis of "new evidence and allegations [which] have come forth." Mtn at p.1 That evidence consisted primarily of published articles about Nike completely unrelated to the facts of this case. . On December 5, 2014 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the Court's Order of Dismissal.  Plaintiff persists in his argument that defendant's service of a responsive pleading upon plaintiff's counsel at the address listed on the complaint is not sufficient service.
Then things really got strange. Beginning December 5, 2014, Plaintiff began propounding discovery requests in the form of Request for Production. See [61, 62, 67, 68] No evidence of actual service of this discovery is evident other than the efiling. The discovery is served "under Rule 26 [disclosures] and 30 [depositions] of the FRCP." See e.g. Plaintiff's Request for Production, docket entry 61. The requests do not comply with FRCP Rule 34 in a number of respects, such as specifying a date by which production is to be made. However, this is not relevant to the matter now before the court.
On December 8, 2014 Plaintiff filed a motion to Reassign the Case to a different judge. That motion was randomly assigned to this court for determination. .
Under 18 U.S.C. § 455(a), the standard for recusal is "whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986).
The statute provides in part "(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary ...