California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCE327615 Charles W. Ervin, Judge.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney, Laura E. Tanney, Linh Lam, and Lilia Encisco Garcia, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
After Hugo Joseph Camp entered into a plea agreement with the People, the trial court imposed a stipulated split sentence of 28 months, with 14 months to be served in local custody and 14 months under mandatory supervision. In preparing for Camp's release from custody, the probation officer filed a report indicating that the officer had recently learned that Camp was ineligible for mandatory supervision because he was subject to an immigration hold and would be deported upon his release from custody. At a hearing to consider this issue, defense counsel requested that the court terminate the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's sentence and permit him to be deported. The trial court agreed, terminated the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's sentence, and ordered Camp released to an immigration enforcement agent.
On appeal, the People contend that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in terminating the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's split sentence. The People maintain that the court's only options were to order Camp to serve the remainder of the 28-month sentence in custody, or permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm the trial court's order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Camp with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) (count 1), burglary (§ 459) (count 2), petty theft (§ 484) (count 3), and resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4). As to the petty theft charge (§ 484) (count 3), the People alleged that Camp had suffered three prior theft convictions. The People also alleged that Camp had suffered four prison priors (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668).
One week later, the People and Camp entered into a plea agreement. The plea agreement stated that Camp would plead guilty to grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c)),  and resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4) and would admit having incurred one prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The agreement further stated that the People would dismiss the balance of the charges and that Camp would be sentenced to a stipulated split sentence (§ 1170, former subd. (h)(5)(B)(i)) of 28 months, with 14 months to be served in local custody and 14 months under mandatory supervision. That same day, the trial court held a change of plea hearing and accepted Camp's plea of guilty.
The court sentenced Camp as follows: "Pursuant to the agreement in this case it is the judgment and sentence of this court that this defendant be committed to the custody of the sheriff pursuant to [section] 1170, [subdivision] (H)(5)(B), which is local prison, to serve the term stipulated to be 28 months. [¶]... After the first 14 months he serves actually in custody, the latter portion will be suspended and served in the community under the supervision of the probation department."
In preparation for Camp's release from the sheriff's custody to mandatory supervision, the probation officer filed a report indicating that an agent of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had informed the probation officer that Camp was in the United States illegally, and that he would be "deported to South Africa." The report further stated that Camp would be "released from the Sheriff's custody directly to ICE custody." The report then states the following: "[The deportation] will make the offender unavailable for mandatory supervision. Therefore it is recommended that he serve the remainder of his term in the custody of the Sheriff's Department without release to the community. If this is not possible, due to the stipulated plea agreement, it is recommended that the case be sent back to the sentencing court for a change of plea to address this development."
The trial court held a hearing concerning the issue raised in the supplemental probation report. At the hearing, defense counsel requested that the court "terminate the mandatory supervision, " in light of the fact that Camp was going to be released to ICE's custody and then deported. The court asked the
prosecutor for the People's position. The prosecutor stated, "The People would, at least, like to see [Camp] serve his custodial commit and then we would submit on the court's discretion after that." The court then asked the probation officer for his department's position. The officer stated, "Nothing further other than it doesn't sound like he'll be eligible for mandatory supervision if he's being deported."
After the parties submitted the matter to the court, the court terminated Camp's mandatory supervision and modified his sentence, stating: "Probation is terminated and denied. He is to serve 364 days in jail with credit for 364, 182, 182 good time/work time credits on top of the actual. [¶] He can go back to wherever they are going to deport him to. ICE has a hold of him now. The court finds good cause to modify the previously agreed upon sentencing structure in this case."
The People timely appealed the trial court's order terminating Camp's mandatory supervision and modifying his sentence.
The trial court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction in terminating Camp's mandatory supervision and modifying his sentence
The People claim that the trial court acted in "excess of its jurisdiction by releasing Camp from the remaining 14 months of his suspended sentence
when he became ineligible for mandatory supervision." The People argue that the trial court's act in terminating Camp's mandatory supervision, without placing him in custody for the remainder of his suspended sentence, resulted in an "unauthorized sentence" that "must be vacated." The People's contention presents a pure question of law, which requires us to interpret the statutes governing mandatory supervision. Accordingly, we apply the de novo standard of review. (See e.g., Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 417 ["We apply the de ...