United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Re: Dkt. No. 195
LUCY H. KOH, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Chris Werdebaugh's ("Plaintiff" or "Werdebaugh") motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of this Court's order granting decertification of the damages class. ECF No. 195. Having considered Plaintiff's motion, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration.
The gravamen of Plaintiff's action is that Defendant Blue Diamond Growers ("Defendant"), a leading producer of almond milk products, violated federal regulations and California law by deceptively labeling and advertising its products. More specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant's use of the "All Natural" labeling claim, and listing the sweetener used in its products as "Evaporated Cane Juice" instead of as "sugar." Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 136, ¶¶ 31, 42. Plaintiff alleges violations of 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.4(a)(1), 101.22, 101.30, 102.5(a), 102.5(d), and 120.1(a), as well as 21 U.S.C. § 343, and California Health & Safety Code Sections 110390, 110395, 110398, 110400, 110660, 110720, 110725, 110735, 110740, 110760, 110765, and 110770. See SAC ¶¶ 64-76.
Werdebaugh filed his original Complaint on May 29, 2012. ECF No. 1. Blue Diamond filed an answer on September 25, 2012. ECF No. 20. The Parties stipulated to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint as well as to the Court dismissing with prejudice claims in the original Complaint based on the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. ECF Nos. 36, 37.
Werdebaugh filed his FAC on May 24, 2013. ECF No. 38. Blue Diamond filed its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to strike particular allegations in the FAC on June 24, 2013. ECF No. 46. On July 22, 2013, Werdebaugh filed his opposition, ECF No. 48, as well as a request that the Court take judicial notice of certain exhibits, ECF No. 49. Defendant filed its reply on August 30, 2013. ECF No. 58. On October 2, 2013, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to strike. ECF No. 65. Defendant subsequently filed an Answer to the FAC on November 1, 2013. ECF No. 69.
On January 17, 2014, Werdebaugh moved for class certification. ECF No. 74. Defendant filed an opposition on March 7, 2014, ECF No. 98, along with evidentiary objections to Plaintiff's expert declarations filed in support of class certification, ECF Nos. 102-03. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's evidentiary objections on March 20, 2014, ECF Nos. 110-11, and on March 28, 2014 filed a reply, ECF No. 115. The Court held a hearing on May 22, 2014, and on May 23, 2014, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's motion for class certification. ("Class Cert. Order"), ECF No. 131.
Following the Court's order on class certification, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 3, 2014. ECF 136. Following the close of expert discovery, Defendant filed a motion to decertify the damages class on October 30, 2014. ECF No. 167. Plaintiff filed his opposition on November 13, 2014. ECF No. 175. Defendant filed its reply on November 20, 2014. ECF No. 180.
The Court granted Defendant's motion to decertify the damages class on December 15, 2014. ECF No. 190. On December 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed his motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decertification order.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Civil Local Rule 7-9(a) states: "Before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case, any party may make a motion before a Judge requesting that the Judge grant the party leave to file a motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory order.... No party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining leave of Court to file the motion." Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) provides three grounds for reconsideration of an interlocutory order:
(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court ...