United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE Re: Dkt. No. 197
LUCY H. KOH, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Chris Werdebaugh's ("Plaintiff" or "Werdebaugh") motion for voluntary dismissal of this action with prejudice. ECF No. 197. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing and case management conference scheduled for May 14, 2015. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. This order does not preclude Defendant from otherwise seeking appropriate attorney's fees or costs pursuant to statute or rule.
The gravamen of Plaintiff's action is that Defendant Blue Diamond Growers ("Defendant"), a leading producer of almond milk products, violated federal regulations and California law by deceptively labeling and advertising its products. More specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant's use of the "All Natural" labeling claim, and listing the sweetener used in its products as "Evaporated Cane Juice" instead of as "sugar." Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 136, ¶¶ 31, 42. Plaintiff alleges violations of 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.4(a)(1), 101.22, 101.30, 102.5(a), 102.5(d), and 120.1(a), as well as 21 U.S.C. § 343, and California Health & Safety Code Sections 110390, 110395, 110398, 110400, 110660, 110720, 110725, 110735, 110740, 110760, 110765, and 110770. See SAC ¶¶ 64-76.
Werdebaugh filed his original Complaint on May 29, 2012. ECF No. 1. Blue Diamond filed an answer on September 25, 2012. ECF No. 20. The Parties stipulated to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint as well as to the Court dismissing with prejudice claims in the original Complaint based on the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. ECF Nos. 36, 37. Werdebaugh filed his FAC on May 24, 2013. ECF No. 38. Blue Diamond filed its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to strike particular allegations in the FAC on June 24, 2013. ECF No. 46. On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed his opposition, ECF No. 48. Defendant filed its reply on August 30, 2013. ECF No. 58. On October 2, 2013, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to strike. ECF No. 65. Defendant subsequently filed an Answer to the FAC on November 1, 2013. ECF No. 69.
On January 17, 2014, Werdebaugh moved for class certification. ECF No. 74. Defendant filed an opposition on March 7, 2014, ECF No. 98, along with evidentiary objections to Plaintiff's expert declarations filed in support of class certification, ECF Nos. 102-03. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's evidentiary objections on March 20, 2014, ECF Nos. 110-11, and on March 28, 2014 filed a reply, ECF No. 115. The Court held a hearing on May 22, 2014, and on May 23, 2014, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's motion for class certification. ("Class Cert. Order"), ECF No. 131.
Following the Court's order on class certification, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 3, 2014. ECF 136. Following the close of expert discovery, Defendant filed a motion to decertify the damages class on October 30, 2014. ECF No. 167. Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion for decertification on November 13, 2014. ECF No. 175. Defendant filed its reply on November 20, 2014. ECF No. 180. Defendant's motion to decertify was set for hearing on December 4, 2014. On December 2, 2014, the Court vacated the hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). ECF No. 182. The Court granted Defendant's motion to decertify the damages class on December 15, 2014. ECF No. 190. On December 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed his motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decertification order. The Court denied Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration on January 29, 2015. ECF No. 199.
Simultaneously with its motion to decertify, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on October 30, 2014. ECF No. 166. Pursuant to the Court's November 7, 2014 order, ECF No. 172, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion for summary judgment on December 8, 2014, ECF No. 187, and Defendant filed its reply on January 12, 2015, ECF No. 196. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was set for hearing on February 5, 2015.
On January 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for voluntary dismissal of this action. ECF No. 197. In light of the upcoming hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment, that same day the Court ordered Defendant to file a response by February 2, 2015. ECF No. 198. Defendant filed its timely opposition and objection. ECF No. 201.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), a plaintiff may request dismissal of an action after the filing of an answer or motion for summary judgment by order of the Court, "on terms that the [C]ourt considers proper." See also Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996). "A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result." Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, Plaintiff moves to dismiss his action with prejudice and argues that Defendant will not suffer "plain legal prejudice" as defined by the Ninth Circuit. The Court agrees.
While dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2) are subject to the discretion of the district court, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a district court "should grant" such motions unless a defendant can show it will "suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result." Lenches, 263 F.3d at 975. "[L]egal prejudice is... prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, some legal argument." Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97. Legal prejudice does not include "the threat of future litigation, " or uncertainty "because a dispute remains unresolved." Lenches, 263 F.3d at 976 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the mere fact that "defendant will be inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum" or that ...