United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE BANK'S MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. 7]
DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.
Presently before the court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase" or "Defendant")'s Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion and adopts the following order.
In July 2016, Plaintiff executed a Deed of Trust to real property located at 607 S. Gertruda Avenue in the city of Redondo Beach as security for a $1, 172, 500.00 mortgage against the property. (Complaint ¶¶ 7-8; Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Ex. 1 at 3.) Chase is the mortgage servicer. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 10.)
On March 12, 2010, Chase recorded a Notice of Default. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The Complaint alleges that "[d]uring the year 2013, Plaintiff submitted a completed, legible and satisfactory loan modification application" to Chase. (Id. ¶ 28.) On January 8, 2014, Chase recorded a Substitution of Trustee listing itself as beneficiary and naming Defendant Albertelli Law Partners California, PA ("ALAW") as trustee. (RJN Ex. 5). On March 20, 2014, ALAW recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale with a sale date of April 10, 2014. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-21.) The sale date was later postponed. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges eight causes of action related to foreclosure proceedings. Chase now moves to dismiss the Complaint.
II. Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations, " it must offer "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely offers "labels and conclusions, " a "formulaic recitation of the elements, " or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their claims rise "above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As an initial matter, the court notes that all of Plaintiff's authorities regarding the legal standard predate Iqbal and Twombly. Plaintiffs' arguments in opposition to Chase's motion appear to be based upon the resulting misapprehension of the relevant standard. In any event, Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of his Second Cause of Action. (Opposition at 7.) The court addresses the other causes of action in turn.
A. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff's brings a cause of action for injunctive relief to enjoin violations of California Civil Code § 2924.12. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Injunctive relief, however, is a remedy, not a cause of action. Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F.Supp.2d 952, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Moreover, as Plaintiff's Complaint appears to recognize, § 2924.12(a)(1) states that "a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation of Section 2923.55, 2923., 2923.7, 2923.9, 2923.11, or 2923.17." Cal. Civil Code § 2924.12(a)(1). Section 2924.12 does not create a cause of action for an injunction, but rather provides for injunctive relief as a remedy for violations of other foreclosure-related statutes. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
B. Dual Tracking
California Civil Code § 2923.6(c) states: "If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan modification... a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale..." unless certain other conditions are met. Cal. Civil Code § 2923.6(c). Section 2923.6 also sets forth that an application is "complete' when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents required by the ...