United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF No. 16)
BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
Plaintiff Guillermo Trujillo ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on September 8, 2014. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on February 26, 2015, is currently before the Court for screening.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at SATF/Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff names Warden Stu Sherman as the sole defendant in his individual and official capacity.
Plaintiff alleges: On August 8, 2013, Plaintiff was confined at SATF/Corcoran State Prison. On September 1, 2013, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Sherman through institutional mail and explained that Correctional Officer Munoz was threatening and harassing him. Plaintiff asked that Officer Munoz stop this practice, including fomenting rumors of violence against Plaintiff or provoking other inmates to target Plaintiff for assault.
On September 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a 602 grievance concerning Officer Munoz's threats that he wanted to stab and hurt Plaintiff.
On December 21, 2013, Plaintiff explained during an interview regarding his grievance and they should have known about the serious consequences they had created or provoked.
On November 1, 2013, Plaintiff was unlawfully subjected to be the target of an assault with a deadly weapon as retaliation for filing 602 grievances. Plaintiff was assaulted because Defendant Sherman was negligent and failed to protect him from harm.
A. Official Capacity and ...