United States District Court, S.D. California
PAUL STEMPLE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
QC HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant.
ORDER: (1) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF NO. 78); (2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (ECF NO. 85); AND (3) GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO STAY FOR 90 DAYS (ECF NO. 88)
CYNTHIA BASHANT, District Judge.
Presently before the Court are (1) a motion for reconsideration filed by defendant QC Holdings, Inc. ("Defendant") of the Court's order granting in part and denying in part the motion for class certification filed by plaintiff Paul Stemple ("Plaintiff") (ECF No. 78); (2) Defendant's ex parte motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 85); and (3) a joint motion to stay all proceedings for 90 days to allow time for a jointly agreed-upon mediation (ECF No. 88).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 78),  DENIES Defendant's ex parte motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 85), and GRANTS the joint motion to stay all proceedings for 90 days to allow time for a jointly agreed-upon mediation (ECF No. 88).
Plaintiff commenced this putative Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227, class action on August 13, 2012. Defendant thereafter filed an answer and the parties proceeded to discovery. On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to certify the following class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3):
All persons whose 10-digit cellular telephone numbers with a California area code were listed by an account holder in the Employment and/or Contacts fields of a California customer loan application produced to [Defendant], which were called by [Defendant] using an [ATDS] and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice for the purpose of collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt from the account holder, between August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012.
(ECF No. 39-1 at p. 4.) Defendant opposed class certification. (ECF No. 54.) On September 5, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's motion for class certification. (ECF No. 75.) Specifically, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and granted Plaintiff's motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), and modified the class definition sua sponte to state:
All persons whose 10-digit cellular telephone numbers with a California area code were listed by an account holder in the Employment and/or Contacts fields, but were not listed in the Personal fields, of a California customer loan application produced to [Defendant], which were called by [Defendant] using an ATDS and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice for the purpose of collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt from the account holder, between August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012.
( Id. at pp. 15-18 (modification in bold)). Defendant now moves to reconsider the Court's order granting class certification. (ECF No. 78) The parties also jointly move to stay this action for 90 days pending mediation. (ECF No. 88.)
II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. Legal Standard
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Ben Sager Chem. Int'l v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977)). Under Rule 60(b), the court may grant reconsideration of an order based on: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court's decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). That last prong is "used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment." Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007).
District courts also have the inherent authority to entertain motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders. Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[I]nterlocutory orders... are subject to modification by the district judge at any time prior to final judgment."); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989). To determine the merits of a request to reconsider an interlocutory order, the court applies the standard required under a Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (Whelan, J.).
"Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. However, a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. Id. It does not give parties a "second bite ...