Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Fulwider Patton LLP v. Accentra, Inc.

United States District Court, C.D. California

March 20, 2015

ACCENTRA, INC., Defendant.


OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, District Judge.


Plaintiff Fulwider Patton LLP ("Fulwider") is a law firm which specializes in intellectual property. On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Accentra Inc. ("Defendant") alleging that Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff for legal services provided pursuant to a written agreement. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant failed to answer, default was entered, and Plaintiff now moves for entry of default judgment. (ECF Nos. 14, 16.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Application for Default Judgment. (ECF No. 16.)


On March 20, 2007, Defendant retained Plaintiff to provide legal services pursuant to a written agreement. (Compl. ¶ 7; Juo Decl. Ex. A.) The Written Agreement provides the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment and compensation. (Juo Decl. Ex. A.) Todd Moses, the President and CEO of Defendant, signed the Written Agreement, at which point the Written Agreement went into effect.[1] ( Id. )

From September 2007 through December 2010, Plaintiff represented Defendant in Defendant's action against Staples, Inc. ("Staples") for patent infringement.[2] (Juo Decl. ¶ 4; see also Juo Decl. Exs. B, C.) During this time, Plaintiff sent Defendant periodic billing invoices. ( See Brashear Decl. Ex. 1.) From September 30, 2007 through April 30, 2009, Plaintiff provided Defendant with monthly billing invoices. (Brashear Decl. Ex. 1.) After April 30, 2009, the periods between billing invoices became more dispersed.[3] ( Id. )

Defendant made payments on these invoices from November 8, 2007 through August 4, 2009. ( Id. ) Further, Plaintiff credited these payments to Defendant's account on April 30, 2010, June 16, 2010, and November 30, 2010. These payments fully satisfied the invoices from September 30, 2007 through August 31, 2008 and 70 percent of the September 30, 2008 invoice. ( Id. ) Plaintiff allocated none of Defendant's payments to the invoices dated October 31, 2008 through December 31, 2010-Defendant's payments over this time were applied to back-payments for earlier invoices. ( Id. )

On November 10, 2014 Plaintiff filed a Complaint in federal court alleging breach of written contract and account stated. (ECF No. 1.) Proof of Service on Defendant was filed on November 17, 2014, requiring Defendant to answer by December 12, 2014. (ECF No. 7.) On December 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a stipulation extending Defendant's time to answer to January 14, 2015. (ECF No. 8.) The stipulation was stricken on January 21, 2015 for failure to provide the case number. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff corrected this error and refiled the stipulation. (ECF No. 11.) However, Plaintiff's second stipulation was deficient because it failed to include the signature of both parties. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff never corrected this issue; however, the Court recognizes Defendant has refused to participate in the instant action.

On January 29, 2015, default was entered against Defendant. (ECF No. 14.) On February 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant Application for Default Judgment. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff seeks: (1) $282, 247.80 in liquidated damages and (2) pre-judgment interest on the foregoing amount at 10 percent per annum from February 1, 2011 to date of payment pursuant to California Civil Code sections 3287(a) and 3289(b). ( Id. )


Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes a district court to grant default judgment after the Clerk enters default under Rule 55(a). Local Rule 55-1 requires that the movant submit a declaration establishing (1) when and against which party default was entered; (2) identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent person, or active service member; and (4) that the defaulting party was properly served with notice.

A district court has discretion whether to enter default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Upon default, the defendant's liability generally is conclusively established, and the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-19 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).

In exercising its discretion, a court must consider several factors, including (1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the defendant's default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

IV. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.