United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
DENNIS L. BECK, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Jason Page ("Plaintiff") is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on April 21, 2014. Pursuant to Court order, he filed a First Amended Complaint on October 31, 2014. He names the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility ("CSATF"), CSATF Associate Warden Tolson, CSATF Captain Ramirez, CSATF Lieutenant Sneel and Sergeant Beeler as Defendants.
A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious, " that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that... the action or appeal... fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff's allegations must link the actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at CSATF, where the events at issue occurred.
Plaintiff's allegations concern what he believes to be a smuggling operation at CSATF. He believes that Defendants "have conspired to protect fellow staff/employee members who are smuggling illegal contraband into the prison." EFC NO. 13, at 2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are ignoring their safety and security protocol search duties concerning entering staff and are blaming inmates for the trafficking and possession of illegal contraband. Plaintiff believes that this failure placed him at risk of harm.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants had knowledge of an ongoing investigation into the smuggling issues and placed Plaintiff at a greater risk of harm by assigning him to work in the area where the investigation was in progress, "Like a Cobra in Waiting." ECF NO. 13, at 2. According to Plaintiff, the investigation was aimed at uncovering a conspiracy to smuggle illegal contraband into CSATF "E" grounds by way of the Education Department, where Plaintiff was assigned to work.
After eleven days of part-time employment in the Education Department, Plaintiff was "intentionally involved in the arrest of the entire inmate work force." ECF No. 13, at 3. He was arrested and placed into restraints, then placed in an isolation cell in Administrative Segregation. Defendants Sneel and Beeler issued the lock-up order. According to Plaintiff's exhibits, Defendant Snell issued the Ad-Seg Placement Notice and Defendant Beeler served the notice. ECF No. 13, at 12.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Tolson and Ramirez ordered the placement even though they were fully aware that Plaintiff was not guilty of any violations to the safety and security of the institution. Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in Ad-Seg unjustly, and lost all of his classification privileges. He also alleges that this caused irreparable harm to his character and good standing with the staff.
In specifically explaining the involvement of each Defendant, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Tolson violated the Eighth Amendment by accusing him of the illegal introduction of contraband and ordering his arrest and placement in Ad-Seg. He contends that Defendant Tolson knew that Plaintiff had nothing to do with the conspiracy, and no contraband was ever discovered on Plaintiff's person. Despite knowing this, Defendant Tolson promoted an inhumane method of punishment by placing Plaintiff in isolation and ...