United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 34)
JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.
Sengthiene Bosavanh, attorney for Plaintiff Sherry Slade, seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 34.) Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. Defendant filed a provided an analysis of the request for the Court, noting "the Commissioner has a role resembling that of a trustee' for Plaintiff. (Doc. 35 at 2, quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 798, n.6 (2002). For the following reasons, the Court recommends the motion for attorney fees be GRANTED.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff and Ms. Bosavanh entered into a contingent fee agreement on July 20, 2012, which provided Plaintiff would pay twenty-five percent of any awarded past due benefits. (Doc. 34-3.)
On July 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of the administrative decision denying her Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1). The Court determined the administrative law judge "erred in the evaluation of the medical evidence and in giving less weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician." (Doc. 25 at 13.) Therefore, the Court remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 27.) Following the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff (Doc. 28), the Court awarded $7, 243.95 in attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 33.)
On July 31, 2014, an administrative law judge issued a fully favorable decision, concluding Plaintiff was "disabled from September 1, 2004, through the date of the decision." (Doc. 34-4 at 5.) On December 18, 2014, the Commissioner issued a notice to Plaintiff, indicating the retroactive benefits amounted to $100, 934.00. (Doc. 34-2 at 3.)
II. Attorney Fees under § 406(b)
An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is awarded benefits:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, et seq ] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment....
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. Id. at 807.
III. Discussion and Analysis
District courts "have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases." Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review contingent-fee arrangements "as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases." Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider "the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved." Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or excessive delays, and whether the fees are "excessively large in relation to the benefits received." Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
In this case, Plaintiff entered into the contingent fee agreement in which she agreed to pay twenty-five percent of any awarded retroactive benefits. Ms. Bosavanh accepted the risk of loss in the representation and "expended a total of 58.3 hours in representation of Sherry Slade in this matter through the entry of the order of remand. (Doc. 34 at 8, Bosavanh Decl. ¶ 5.) Previously, this Court determined the total time expended by Ms. Bosavanh was not reasonable given the routine and duplicative nature of many tasks, and awarded fees for 38.8 hours of work. (Doc. 32 at 12; Doc. 33.)
As a result of Ms. Bosavanh's work to remand the action to an administrative law judge, Plaintiff ultimately received an award of benefits for disability. For this, Ms. Bosavanh requests a fee of $25, 233.50. (Doc. 21 at 5.) Because $7, 243.95 was paid under the EAJA, the net cost to Plaintiff is $17, 989.55. (Doc. 35 at 4.) This amount does not exceed twenty-five percent of the retroactive benefits. Although served with the motion and informed a response may be ...