United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
SANDRA M. SNYDER, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court on December 20, 2013. Doc. 1. He brought nine causes of action arising under California law against Defendants related to their termination of his employment several months after his disability leave. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint on April 1, 2015, seeking to add two causes of action arising under federal law. Doc. 47.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court had doubts as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and required the parties to submit supplemental briefing to address this concern. Doc. 37. The complaint alleged diversity of citizenship, but it appeared that at least one defendant, DNC Parks & Resorts at Tenaya, Inc. ("DNC at Tenaya") was a citizen of California, as was Plaintiff. Defendants submitted a declaration, asserting that DNC at Tenaya has three directors, two of whom are located in Buffalo, New York, with the third located in Boston, Massachusetts. Doc. 49. Defendants further asserted that critical aspects of DNC at Tenaya's operations, including executive, payroll, accounting, human resources, and capital spending are made at the corporate headquarters in Buffalo.
For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation's principal place of business, or the "nerve center, " as it has been called in Courts of Appeals, refers to "the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010). The court may properly require a party asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction to establish its jurisdictional allegations by competent proof. See Id. at 130 S.Ct. at 1194-95. Based on the evidence provided by Defendants, the Court may reasonably conclude that DNC at Tenaya's nerve center is in New York, and subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity has been sufficiently established by competent proof.
Plaintiff alleges in his proposed first amended complaint that he was employed by Defendants in July 2010 as an assistant food and beverage manager at DNC at Tenaya. In June 2011, he suffered an injury at work and was limited by a doctor to modified work duties, which he performed competently for approximately two and a half months, with one week medical leave in July. From August 2, 2011 to September 29, 2011, Plaintiff was placed on temporary disability, which Defendants designated as FMLA leave. Upon returning to work in September 2011 until January 2012, Plaintiff performed his modified duties competently. On January 4, 2012, Plaintiff was told that his position was terminated and he was escorted from the building. At least twice in the following year and a half, Plaintiff was approached with a job offer from Defendants, but he did not end up receiving either job.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this Court alleging wrongful termination, disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, failure to engage in the interactive process, unlawful retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and/or retaliation, retaliation in violation of CFRA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair business practices. After discovery was closed, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, the first motion on the merits of this case. The parties' briefing raised a concern over federal subject matter jurisdiction, as mentioned above. Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for leave to file a first amended complaint in order to add federal claims and maintain federal jurisdiction, which was denied for failing to demonstrate irreparable prejudice.
In the instant motion, and in his reply, Plaintiff implies that he is only requesting leave to file an amended complaint to add federal claims to remain in federal court. See Doc. 47, Motion at 6:24-26, 8:27-28; Doc. 51, Reply at 2:9-12. Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint adds references to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Plaintiff argues that he is "not seeking to add any new causes of action or new facts, " but is "clarifying his claims by referencing the applicable federal statutes in addition to the previously referenced state statues." Doc. 47 at 5:15-17. However, Plaintiff also argues that the Court should consider whether or not Plaintiff can prevail on violations of the federal statutes in the order on the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the amendment does not substantially prejudice Defendants, is not made in bad faith, will not cause undue delay, and is not futile. Plaintiff's reasoning to support each of these arguments is the same - that the federal claims are substantially similar to the state claims and are based on the same facts.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff unduly delayed seeking leave to file an amended complaint because he knew the facts and theories raised by the amendment at the time of the original pleading. Defendants further argue that they would suffer prejudice if the amendment were permitted because they would be required to file a separate or supplemental motion for summary judgment to address the federal causes of action, and would possibly need to seek to reopen and conduct additional discovery.
The Court has reviewed the proposed amendment and, without determining if it is brought with undue delay or would prejudice Defendants, finds that the proposed amendment would be futile because it would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a cognizable claim.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Leave to amend "shall be given freely when justice so requires." FRCP 15(a). "But a district court need not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4) is futile." A merisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006).
A proposed amendment is futile if it fails to state a cognizable claim and would be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Although leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff's proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile."); S AES Getters S.p.A. v. Aeronex, Inc., 219 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2002) ("an amendment is futile' only if it would clearly be subject to dismissal"). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin ...