United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Re: Dkt. No. 430
JAMES DONATO, District Judge.
This is a patent infringement case in which the Court granted summary judgment of noninfringement with respect to the vast majority of accused products. See Dkt. No. 422. Almost a month later, after the Court had already directed entry of final judgment of noninfringement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), see Dkt. No. 429, plaintiff Largan filed a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, see Dkt. No. 430. Because Largan has not met the standard for seeking reconsideration of the Court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, the Court denies the motion.
Where the court's ruling has resulted in a final judgment, a motion for reconsideration may be based either on Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motion for relief from judgment) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Am. Ironworks & Erectors v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). In either case, this district's local rules only permit a motion for reconsideration if the party bringing the motion showed "reasonable diligence in bringing the motion" and one of the following factors:
(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.
Civil L.R. 7-9(b).
I. LEAVE TO MOVE FOR RECONSIDERATION
Largan seeks leave to move for reconsideration on two issues. First, it seeks summary judgment of induced infringement with respect to a small number of samples that defendant Genius shipped into the U.S., for which the Court already granted summary judgment of direct infringement. It also asks the Court to reverse its grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, based in part on documents that it claims were produced after the oppositions and replies to the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on infringement.
With respect to the first issue, it was not clear from Largan's initial motion for summary judgment of infringement that it sought summary judgment of induced infringement for the lens samples Genius sent to the U.S. even if it prevailed on direct infringement, and neither party briefed the elements of induced infringement with respect to the samples. Because the Court has stayed resolution of all infringement-related issues, including willfulness and injunctive relief, until the parties' settlement conference is complete, the Court will order briefing on the issue of induced infringement of the samples when it lifts the stay.
With respect to the second issue, Largan does not specify which of the Civil Local Rule 7-9 grounds for reconsideration justifies its request - even if waiting more than four weeks to file a motion for reconsideration constituted "reasonable diligence in bringing the motion, " which it does not. Civil L.R. 7-9(b). It cannot be that the discovery Largan obtained following the Court's orders in December - constituted a "material difference in fact" that can justify reconsideration, because that ground requires showing that "the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order." Civil L.R. 7-9(b)(1). But Largan admits that Genius produced the discovery by December 30, 2014, three months before the Court's March 31, 2015, summary judgment order. Largan did not bring up the evidence that purportedly justifies reconsideration at the March 18, 2015, hearing, or ask to file supplemental briefing including any of the evidence during this three-month period. Since Largan did know of these facts "at the time of the interlocutory order, " they cannot justify reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(1). Largan's motion also points to no "new material facts or a change of law" that would justify granting reconsideration under Civil Local Rule ...