United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER FOLLOWING TELEPHONIC DISCOVERY CONFERENCE
WILLIAM V. GALLO, Magistrate Judge.
On April 14, 2015, this Court held a telephonic Discovery Conference with counsel for both parties. The parties sought the Court's guidance during a deposition as to whether Defendant's objections were proper. Plaintiff argued that Defendant was making speaking objections. Plaintiff expressed concern that Defense counsel was coaching the witness and obstructing Plaintiff's ability to obtain an accurate response from the witness. During the Discovery Conference, Plaintiff cited a case called Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 6577065 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013) to support his position that Defendant's objections were improper.
Defense counsel argued that his objections were appropriate, as all objections were based on proper grounds such as lack of foundation, relevance, misstates testimony, and other similar objections. Defense counsel argued that he was not coaching the witness, but rather, was trying to make sure that the witness understood the questions being asked. He explained that he was not making two or three sentence objections.
II. RELEVANT LAW
During a deposition an attorney may properly state objections "concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner." Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(c)(2). As a general rule, "instructions not to answer questions at a deposition are improper." Detoy v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 196 F.R.D. 362, 365 (N.D. Cal. 2000). "A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3)." Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(c)(2) (emphasis added). "If a party believes that a particular question asked of a deponent is improper for any other reason, that party may object; however, the examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any objection.'" Mendez v. R Carriers, Inc., 2012 WL 1535756, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(c)(2).)
Under Rule 30(d)(3), "[a]t any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may move to terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party...If the objecting deponent or party so demands, the deposition must be suspended for the time necessary to obtain an order." Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(3)(A).
III. COURT DISCUSSION
A. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS WERE PROPER
During the Discovery Conference, the Court read the case cited by Plaintiff, Doe v. City of San Diego, a case from this judicial district. Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 6577065. In Doe, counsel instructed one witness not to answer no fewer than twenty-eight times. Id. at 5. Counsel's instructions not to answer were preceded by various objections, including that the question at issue had been asked and answered, invaded the privacy rights of the witness and/or other non-parties, exceeded the scope of the deposition and/or lacked relevance, lacked foundation, sought personnel information and official information from the police department, assumed facts, and misstated the prior testimony of the witness. Id.
The Doe court found that most of counsel's objections did not provide adequate grounds for his instructions to the witness not to answer. Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 6577065, at *5. The court stated that an attorney can instruct "a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3)." Id; citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(c) (2). Therefore, the court found that counsel's objections that questions had been asked and answered, exceeded the scope of the deposition, lacked relevance, assumed facts, and misstated the prior testimony of the witness, were improper grounds for instructing the witness not to answer. Id; see Jadwin v. Abraham, 2008 WL 4057921, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) ("[A]n objection that the question might have been repetitive was not a proper basis to instruct the witness not to answer it.").
Here, the Court determined that the Doe case did not provide support for Plaintiff's argument that Defendant's objections were improper. During the Discovery Conference, the Court noted that in Doe, the objections were improper because they were followed by instructions to the witness not to answer the question. The objections themselves were not improper. The Court distinguished the Doe case from the instant situation because here, Plaintiff did not argue that Defendant was instructing the witness not to answer. Rather, Plaintiff's dispute was with the form of Defendant's objections.
After distinguishing the Doe case upon which Plaintiff relied, the Court determined that Defendant's objections were proper. The Court noted that, if Defense counsel attempted to telegraph an answer to the witness through objections, such objections would be entirely improper. However, it did not appear that Defense counsel was using his objections to telegraph answers to the witness. Further, Defendant was not asserting ...