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Henry v. Cate

United States District Court, E.D. California

July 13, 2015

KENNETH R. HENRY, Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW CATE, Defendants.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM BE DENIED (Docs. 16, 23, and 26) OBJECTION DEADLINE: FIFTEEN DAYS

SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Kenneth Henry ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 23, 2014. This action for damages is proceeding against Defendants Jolley, [1] Contreras, and Ortega ("Defendants") for using excessive physical force against Plaintiff in 2013, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

On May 6, 2015, Defendants Contreras and Jolley filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 22, 2015, Defendants Contreras and Jolley filed a reply on June 2, 2015; and Defendant Ortega filed a notice of joinder in the motion on June 12, 2015.[2] On June 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a surreply and on June 23, 2015, Defendants Contreras and Jolley filed a motion to strike.[3]

Defendants Contreras and Jolley's motion to dismiss has been submitted upon the record pursuant to Local Rule 230( l ), and for the reasons that follow, the Court recommends the motion be denied.

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court's review is generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Huynh, 465 F.3d at 996-97; Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). Courts may not supply essential elements not initially pled, Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014), but "[c]ourts in this circuit have an obligation to give a liberal construction to the filings of pro se litigants, especially when they are civil rights claims by inmates, " Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013). Pro se complaints "may only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)). "This rule relieves pro se litigants from the strict application of procedural rules and demands that courts not hold missing or inaccurate legal terminology or muddled draftsmanship against them." Blaisdell, 729 F.3d at 1241.

III. Discussion

A. Introduction

Plaintiff's complaint was screened and the Court determined it stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 908 ("Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).'") (quoting Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening standard is the same as Rule 12(b)(6) standard). Defendants' acknowledgement that the complaint was screened is appreciated; however, they present no arguments which persuade the Court it erred in determining that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims were cognizable or that any other grounds justifying relief from the screening order exist. See Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an intervening change in the law occurred; (3) the evidence on remand was substantially different; (4) other changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result."). As explained below, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to allow him to proceed past the pleading stage.

B. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims arise from two alleged incidents of excessive force against him at California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, where he was incarcerated at the time. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986)) (quotation marks omitted). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are totally without penological justification, Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted), and punitive treatment which amounts to gratuitous infliction of wanton and unnecessary pain is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, id. at 738 (quotation marks omitted).

What is necessary to show sufficient harm under the Eighth Amendment depends upon the claim at issue, with the objective component being contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted). For excessive force claims, the core judicial inquiry is whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (quotation marks omitted). Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Necessarily excluded from constitutional recognition is the de ...


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