United States District Court, C.D. California
PHILIP S. GUTIERREZ, District Judge.
Proceedings (In Chambers): Order GRANTING Plaintiff's motion to remand
Before the Court is Plaintiff Myla Wyatt's ("Plaintiff") motion to remand. Dkt. # 31. The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the moving and opposing papers the Court GRANTS the motion.
This case arises from two loans that Plaintiff Myla Wyatt ("Plaintiff" or "Wyatt") obtained from Defendant Aurora Commercial Corp. ("Aurora" or "Defendant") to refinance her home in 2007. See FAC ¶¶ 9-12. These loans were secured by real property commonly known as 10546 De Haven Avenue, Pacoima, California 91331. Id. ¶ 10.
At some point, Plaintiff was unable to "make the monthly mortgage payment" and Plaintiff accepted a loan modification in July 2009. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "did not follow the proper guidelines and failed to meaningfully assess Plaintiff's financial condition" with respect to the loan modification, placing her arrears as a balloon payment at the end of her mortgage. Id. ¶ 1.
On August 23, 2013, Defendants recorded a Notice of Default ("NOD") on the property. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not satisfy required compliance standards prior to filing the NOD, did not provide statutorily required notices before the foreclosure proceedings, failed to participate in the Keep Your Home California modification program, failed to assess Plaintiff's mortgage for modification assistance under HAMP, and assigned a trust which was void and had no interest upon which to foreclose. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 6, 2014 in Los Angeles Superior Court against Aurora, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, and RSM&A Foreclosure Services, LLC (collectively, "Defendants"). Dkt. # 1. The case was removed on December 24, 2014. Id.
Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on April 14, 2015, excluding Aurora from the FAC. Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff asserts claims against the remaining defendants for: (1) racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment Housing Act (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12900, et seq. ) and the Federal Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq.); (2) breach of contract; (3) wrongful foreclosure under Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.55; (4) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6; (5) contractual breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) unconscionability; (8) predatory lending in violation of Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (9) negligence; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) injunctive relief; and (12) violation of the Homeowner Bill of Rights under Cal. Civ. Code § 2920.5. FAC. ¶¶ 37-106. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, a loan modification and "an order enjoining the subject Trustee's Sale." Id. at 23.
Plaintiff now moves to remand this case. Dkt. # 31.
II. Legal Standard
Generally, subject matter jurisdiction is based on the presence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or on complete diversity between the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, there must be "complete" diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy must exceed $75, 000. See Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (3 Cranch) (1806); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
If at any time before the entry of final judgment it appears that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case removed from state court, it must remand the action to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991). There is a "strong presumption" against removal jurisdiction and the party seeking removal always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, ...