Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Oliver v. Beceraa

United States District Court, S.D. California

March 9, 2016

CHRISTOPHER OLIVER, Plaintiff,
v.
LANAE BECERAA, Defendant.

          ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A); AND (2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)

          HON LARRY ALAN BURNS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Christopher Oliver (“Plaintiff”), a former state inmate, has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, his probation officer, has violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an illegal search and has discriminated against him based on his disabilities. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff seeks 1.5 million dollars in compensatory damages and 3 million dollars in punitive damages. (Id. at 7.)

         Plaintiff has not paid the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.)

         I. Proper Parties

         As an initial matter, the Court finds that while Plaintiff appears to bring claims on behalf of his Mother, only Plaintiff has signed the Complaint, and only he has requested leave to proceed IFP. Pro se litigants have no authority to represent anyone other than themselves; therefore, they lack the representative capacity to file motions and other documents on behalf of other persons. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] non-lawyer ‘has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.'” (quoting Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege is personal to him.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (“[I]f the party is not represented by an attorney, [every written motion and other paper] shall be signed by the party.”). Thus, because only Plaintiff, a non-attorney proceeding pro se, has signed the Complaint, and only Plaintiff has requested IFP status, he is the only proper Plaintiff in this case. Purported claims by anyone else, including Plaintiff's Mother, are therefore DISMISSED from this action.

         II. Motion to Proceed IFP

         All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

         However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full amount of filing fees in civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).

         Because Plaintiff is not a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the filing fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not apply to this case. Therefore, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's affidavit of assets, just as it would for any other non-prisoner litigant seeking IFP status, and finds it is sufficient to show that he is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain a civil action. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2(d).

         Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

         III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

         A. Standard of Review

         A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte dismissal, however, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

         All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.