California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS in mandate, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
ZM014603, Daniel Juarez, Judge.
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COUNSEL
Jackie
Lacey, Los Angeles County District Attorney, Steven Katz,
Head Deputy District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and Roberta
T. Schwartz, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.
No
appearance for Respondent. Ronald L. Brown, Los Angeles
County Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, David Santiago
and Nicole Campbell, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Party
in Interest.
OPINION
MANELLA,
J.
In the
underlying proceeding pursuant to the Sexually Violent
Predator Act (SVP Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600
et seq.), the trial court granted real party in interest
Albert Sokolich’s motion to dismiss the petition for
his commitment as a sexually violent predator.[1] Petitioner
seeks a writ directing the court to reinstate the petition,
vacate the order for Sokolich’s release, and set the
matter for further proceedings. We grant the petition for
writ of mandate.
RELEVANT
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May
1995, Sokolich was convicted of annoying and molesting a
child under the age of 18 (Pen. Code, § 647.6) and
carrying a concealed firearm in
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a vehicle (former Pen. Code, § 12025, subd. (a)(1)),
after two girls, aged 11 and 12, reported that he had been
following them for over a month. He was sentenced to three
years of summary probation, five days in jail, and
psychiatric counseling.
Between
November 1999 and February 2000, Sokolich engaged in several
incidents of sexual misconduct involving children between the
ages of six and eight, including exposing himself and
soliciting oral sex. Upon Sokolich’s arrest following
one of the incidents, officers found a knife and thumb cuffs
in his car. Sokolich was convicted of two counts of annoying
and molesting a child under the age of 18 (Pen. Code, §
647.6, subd. (a)), placed on formal probation for five years
and, as a condition of probation, required to serve 180 days
in county jail and participate in psychiatric counseling.
In
August 2001, Sokolich approached two boys while exposing
himself and assaulted one as the other fled. In January 2002,
a jury convicted him of criminal oral copulation (Pen. Code,
§ 288a) and annoying and molesting a child under the age
of 18 (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a)). Sokolich was
sentenced to a prison term of nine years and four
months.[2]
On
April 9, 2009, upon application of the Los Angeles County
District Attorney, the superior court issued an order
directing that Sokolich be delivered into the custody of the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department for an
arraignment on a petition for his commitment as a sexually
violent predator. That proceeding was set for April 21, 2009.
In a
letter to the district attorney dated April 15, 2009, the
California Department of Mental Health (DMH) recommended
Sokolich’s commitment as a sexually violent predator.
The letter (erroneously) listed Sokolich’s release date
set by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (DCR) as April 24, 2009. Two accompanying
documents -- a Summary Referral Sheet and a Level II Screen
-- also listed a release date of April 24, 2009. The correct
release date, as reflected in a handwritten chronology
prepared by the DCR, was April 20, 2009.
On
April 20, 2009, the district attorney filed a petition
seeking Sokolich’s commitment as a sexually violent
predator. Following his arraignment, he participated in
lengthy pre-trial proceedings.
On
September 18, 2015, prior to trial, Sokolich filed a
“Motion to Dismiss/Writ of Habeas Corpus, ”
maintaining that he was not subject to
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confinement as a sexually violent predator because the
petition had been filed on April 20, 2009, his release date.
The motion relied on subdivision (a)(2) of section 6601
(section 6601(a)(2)), which states: “A petition may be
filed under this section if the individual was in custody
pursuant to his or her determinate prison term, parole
revocation term, or a hold placed pursuant to [s]ection
6601.3, at the time the petition is filed. A petition shall
not be dismissed on the basis of a later judicial or
administrative determination that the individual’s
custody was unlawful, if the unlawful custody was the result
of a good faith mistake of fact or law.”
Sokolich’s
motion contended the petition was not timely filed, arguing
that on April 20, 2009, he was not in custody pursuant to a
prison or parole revocation term, and that the district
attorney never sought a 45-day hold on his release pursuant
to section 6601.3.[3] Sokolich further contended there was
no “good faith mistake of fact or law, ” arguing
that the untimely filing was due to intentional misconduct or
negligence because the district attorney’s office had
information reflecting his correct release date.
On
November 13, 2015, the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss. The court concluded that on April 20, 2009,
Sokolich, who had been transferred to Los Angeles to be
arraigned on the petition, was not “in custody”
for purposes of section 6601(a)(2), finding “the
release date for... Sokolich would not count as a date upon
which he could be served with a petition.” The court
found that although Sokolich was then in custody awaiting
arraignment on the petition, he was no longer serving a
determinate prison sentence. The court further concluded that
the untimely filing of the petition did not reflect a good
faith mistake. The court found no “intentional
wrongdoing or anything [of] that nature, ” but
concluded that “there was negligent reliance” by
the district attorney’s office on certain documents
reflecting the incorrect release date of April 24, 2009. The
court stated that there was no “good faith mistake of
fact or law” because the district attorney’s
office and other agencies involved in the filing of the
petition “should have been aware” of the correct
release date.
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On
December 10, 2015, petitioner filed its petition for writ of
mandate. The following day, we imposed a temporary stay. On
April 6, 2016, we issued an order to show cause, and directed
that the stay remain in effect.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner
contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss. As explained below, we agree.
A.
Standard of Review
Our
examination of the ruling on the motion to dismiss applies
established principles. The court’s factual findings
are reviewed for the existence of substantial evidence.
(Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255 [152 Cal.Rptr.3d 878] (Orey);
Langhorne v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th
225, 238 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 560] (Langhorne).) To the
extent the court resolved questions of law regarding the
application of the statutory scheme, we review those
determinations de novo. (See Orey, supra,
at pp. 1251-1253; People v. Superior Court (George)
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 183, 192-193 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 711].)
B.
Sexually Violent ...