United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER RE: APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY THE
COURT AGAINST DEFENDANT JOY 153, INC. 
Honorable Ronald S.W. Lew Senior U.S. District Judge
before this Court is Plaintiff Unicolors Inc.'s
("Plaintiff") Application for Default Judgment by
Court Against Defendant Joy 153, Inc. ("Defendant")
("Application") . The present Application stems
from a copyright infringement action against Defendant.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant has sold unauthorized
reproductions of one if its proprietary textile designs
entitled "OH118" (hereinafter the "Subject
Design"). Upon review of the present Motion and all
relevant papers, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's
Application for Default Judgment, and in doing so, GRANTS
Plaintiff's request for statutory damages, costs, and
composed the Subject Design, an original, two-dimensional
design, for use on textiles. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 1. At
all relevant times, Plaintiff was the exclusive owner of the
Subject Design. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff applied
for and received a United States Copyright Registration for
the Subject Design. Id. at ¶ 12. Prior to this
action, Plaintiff sampled and sold fabric bearing the Subject
Design to numerous parties in the fashion and apparel
industries. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff agreed that
Defendant would be granted the right to exploit the Subject
Design on a certain amount of product in exchange for
Defendant obtaining permission to do so and tendering a
royalty payment to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 14.
Defendant's right to exploit the Subject Design was
conditioned on the making of this payment, which Plaintiff
alleges, was never made. Id.
alleges that Defendant, along with other Defendants that have
since been dismissed, "created, sold, manufactured,
caused to be manufactured, and distributed garments comprised
of fabric featuring designs which are identical to or
substantially similar to the Subject Design (hereinafter
‘Infringing Garments') to at least one retailer . .
. that then sold the garments to the public."
Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff seeks statutory damages
pursuant to Section 504(c)(2) of the Copyright Act,
attorneys' fees, and costs. Id. at ¶ 25;
Appl. for Default Judg. ("Appl.") 10:2-14:9, ECF
filed its Complaint on November 3, 2015 . On November 12,
2015, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Dismissal, dismissing from
the action without prejudice Defendants Nordstrom, Inc. and
Lush Clothing Company, LLC . The action continues against
Defendant Joy 153, Inc. On February 9, 2016, Plaintiff
requested that the clerk of Court enter default against
Defendant . On February 10, 2016, the clerk of Court
entered default against Defendant . On April 1, 2016,
Plaintiff filed the present Application . The Application
was set for hearing on May 3, 2016. The Court found the
Application suitable for decision without oral argument, and
accordingly took the Application under submission on April
28, 2016 .
Application for Default Judgment
judgment is within the discretion of the district court.
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.
1980); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 55. A party applying to the
Court for default judgment must satisfy both procedural and
the requirements set forth in Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rules 55 and 56, and Local Rule 55-1 must be met.
See Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F.Supp.2d 998, 1006
(C.D. Cal 2014). Local Rule 55-1 provides: "When an
application is made to the Court for a default judgment, the
application shall be accompanied by a declaration in
compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(1) and/or (2) and include
the following: (a) When and against what party the default
was entered; (b) The identification of the pleading to which
default was entered; (c) Whether the defaulting party is an
infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person
is represented by a general guardian, committee, conservator
or other representative; (d) That the Service Members Civil
Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 521, does not apply; and (e)
That notice has been served on the defaulting party, if
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2)."
the Ninth Circuit has directed that courts consider the
following factors, referred to as the Eitel factors
in deciding whether to enter default judgment: "(1) the
possibility of prejudice to plaintiff, (2) the merits of
plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the
complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5)
the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts,
(6) whether defendant's default was the product of
excusable neglect, and (7) the strong public policy favoring
decisions on the merits." See Vogel, 992
F.Supp.2d at 1005; see also Eitel v. McCool, 782
F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). Additionally, "[w]hen
entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an
affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the
subject matter and the parties." In re Tuli,
172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999).
analyzing these factors, the Court may base its judgment
entirely upon the affidavits submitted by the parties.
Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.
1981). If the Court determines that the defendant is in
default, "‘the factual allegations of the
complaint, other than those relating to damages, are taken as
true.'" Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal,
826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v.
United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Additionally, "[w]hen entry of judgment is sought
against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend,
a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its
jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the
parties." In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th
Application for Default Judgment
Jurisdiction and Service of Process are Proper
considering whether to enter default judgment against a party
for failing to plead or otherwise defend itself in an action,
a district court must first determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the ...