United States District Court, C.D. California
Desiree A. Penetrante et al.
Jaguar Land Rover NA, LLC et al.
Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District
ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE TO
SOUTHERN DISTRICT ; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
CASE TO SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT 
Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge
the Court are Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America,
LLC’s (“JLRNA”) Motion to Transfer Case to
Southern District (“Motion to Transfer”) filed on
May 11, 2016, as well as Plaintiffs Desiree and Greg
Penetrante’s Motion to Remand Case to San Diego
Superior Court (“Motion to Remand”) filed on May
13, 2016. (Docket Nos. 12-13). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition
to the Motion to Transfer on May 20, 2016, and Defendant
filed an Opposition to the Motion to Remand on May 23, 2016.
(Docket Nos. 15-16). Each moving party’s Reply followed
on May 27, 2016. (Docket Nos. 18, 20).
Court has read and considered the papers filed on the Motion
to Transfer and Motion to Remand, and held a hearing on June
reasons discussed below, the Court RESERVES its ruling on the
Motion to Remand and Motion to Transfer. Defendant is ORDERED
TO SHOW CAUSE as to why the Court should not remand this
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the Court
is satisfied with Defendant’s showing that complete
diversity exists between the parties, the Court will DENY the
Motion to Remand and will TRANSFER the action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to cure the improper removal in the interests
of judicial economy and efficiency.
March 14, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this action in San Diego
County Superior Court for alleged violations of the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Notice of Removal Ex. A
(Docket No. 1-1)). Plaintiffs allege that the vehicle they
purchased from JLRNA in January 2012 contained serious
defects and nonconformities to warranty, for which JLRNA
wrongfully denied warranty coverage. (Id.
¶¶ 8, 15).
April 29, 2016, JLRNA removed the action to this District on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332. (Notice of Removal ¶ 2).
defendant seeking to remove an action grounded in state law
bears the burden to show that “the complaint . . . is
within the original jurisdiction of the district
court.” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340
F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). In most circumstances,
“federal district courts have jurisdiction over suits
for more than $75, 000 where the citizenship of each
plaintiff is different from that of each defendant.”
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)).
addition to satisfying these jurisdictional requirements, the
defendant must also follow procedural rules established by
the removal statute. One such rule provides that removal must
be to the federal district and division
“embracing” the state court in which the action
was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Plaintiffs argue that the Notice of Removal neither
establishes that Plaintiffs are completely diverse from
Defendant nor demonstrates that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75, 000. (Motion to Remand at 4-8). Plaintiffs also
argue that Defendant’s removal is plagued with
procedural deficiencies, including (1) Defendant removed to
the wrong federal district; (2) Defendant failed to file a
proof of service along with the Notice of Removal; and (3)
Defendant improperly completed the civil cover sheet required
in this District. (Motion to Remand at 3-4, 8-10).
filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court. Therefore,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Defendant should have removed
this action to the Southern District, rather than Central
District, of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.”).
is no doubt that this action does not belong before this
Court. Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d
531, 535 (6th Cir. 2002) (“There is only one federal
venue into which a state court action may be removed, and
that is in the statutorily dictated ‘district court . .
. for the district and division embracing the place where
[the state court] action [was] pending.’”
(citations omitted)). Therefore, as to venue, the only
question before the Court is whether the Court should remand
the action because of the procedural defect or
transfer the action to cure the procedural defect.
in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, the
Court would be inclined to transfer the action to cure the
improper removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). But the
Court reaches, as it must, the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction first, and concludes that Defendant has ...