Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Perez v. J & L M Polishing Inc.

United States District Court, C.D. California, Southern Division

June 27, 2016

THOMAS E. PEREZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff,
v.
J & L M POLISHING, INC., a California corporation; JC COATING SOLUTIONS, INC., a California corporation; JULIAN NAVARRO, an individual, and as the managing agent of the Corporate, Defendants; and RIGOBERTO NAVARRO. Defendants.

          Janet M. Herold Regional Solicitor Susan Seletsky Councel for FLSA Luis A. Garcia, Senior Trial Attorney (CSBN #146876) Natalie A. Nardecchia, Trial Attorney (CSBN #246486) Office of the Solicitor (MMS#1500270) United States Department of Labor Attorneys for the Plaintiff secretary of Labor

          CONSENT JUDGMENT [PROPOSED] AND ORDER

          PHILIPS. GUTIERREZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Secretary of Labor and Defendants J & L M POLISHING, INC., JULIAN NAVARRO, JC COATING SOLUTIONS, INC., and RIGOBERTO NAVARRO (collectively "Defendants") have agreed to resolve the matters in controversy in this civil action and consent to the entry of this Consent Judgment for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

         I. LIABILITY

         1. The Secretary filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants violated Sections 6, 7, 11(c), 15(a)(2), 15(a)(3), and 15(a)(5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 211(c), 215(a)(2), 215(a)(3) and 215(a)(5).

         2. Defendants admit that the Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this civil action. Defendants further admit that venue lies in the central district court for the District of California.

         3. The Secretary and Defendants waive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

         4. Defendants acknowledge that they and any individual or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction or in conjunction with Defendants - including but not limited to Juan Manual Flores and Gabriela Camacho - have notice of, and understand, the provisions of this Consent Judgment and Order.

         5. Defendants admit that at all relevant times J & L and JC Coating were enterprises engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(l)(A) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A).

         6. Defendants admit that at all relevant times J & L and Julian Navarro were employers of J & L employees within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

         7. Defendants admit that as of at least as early as April 2016 and continuing to the present. Defendants, and all of them, have been employers of J & L employees and JC Coating employees within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Defendants admit that JC Coating has continued the operation that was being perforaied until April 2016 by J & L, and that at least some of the employees formerly employed by J & L are now employees of JC Coating, which is located in the same business location. Defendants admit that Julian Navarro has at all times exercised control over both the operation and terms and conditions of employment for both J & L and JC Coating employees.

         8. Defendants admit that during the period November 2012 to November 2015, Defendants failed to pay minimum wage to some employees, and specifically to piece rate employees. These violations occurred as a result of Defendants' practice of misclassifying as independent contractors and then paying their piece rate employees without regard to the number of hours that employees worked. Defendants admit that this conduct violated Sections 6 and 15(a)(2) of the FLSA.

         9. Defendants admit that during the period November 2012 to November 2015, Defendants failed to pay employees time and a half their regular rate for hours that employees worked over 40 in a workweek. These violations occurred as a result of Defendants' practice of paying employees their straight time rate, instead of time and a half, for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Defendants admit that this conduct violated Sections 7 and 15(a)(2) of the FLSA.

         10. Defendants admit that during the period November 2012 to November 2015, Defendants failed to make, keep, and preserve accurate records of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment. Defendants admit that this conduct violated Section 11(c) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c).

         11. Defendants admit that following the Secretary's investigation of Defendants' pay practices under the FLSA, which the Secretary initiated in August 2014, Defendants retaliated against employees in violation of Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(c).

         12. Defendants understand and expressly acknowledge that demanding or accepting any of the monies due to any current or former employees under this Consent Judgment and Order, threatening any employee for accepting monies due under this Consent Judgment and Order, or threatening any employee for exercising any of his or her rights under or related to the FLSA is specifically prohibited and may subject Defendants to equitable and legal damages, including punitive damages and civil contempt.

         13. Defendants agree to take all steps necessary to secure and make payment on the funds due under this judgment.

         II. INJUNCTION

         It is therefore, upon motion of the attorneys for the Secretary, and for cause shown, HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that under Section 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 217, Defendants and their agents, family members, attorneys, supervisors, managers, co-employers, employees, successors-in-interest, officers, owners, agents, or directors, and all those in active concert or participation with Defendants or acting on their behalf or at their direction, are permanently enjoined and restrained from violating the provisions of the FLSA, in any of the following manners:

         14. Defendants shall not, contrary to Sections 6 and 15(a)(2) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 215(a)(2), pay any of their employees who in any workweek are engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or who are employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, wages ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.