United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CERTIFICATION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
RICHARD SEEBORG, United States District
Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
Dissatisfied
with the denial of their motion for summary judgment,
defendants seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Local Rule 7-9(b)(3). In the alternative, they
request certification for interlocutory review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). Defendants have done nothing more than
improperly rehash old arguments and argue issues they raised
for the first time in reply. Accordingly, they have failed to
demonstrate any manifest error warranting reconsideration or
extraordinary circumstances to justify an interlocutory
appeal.
II.
RECONSIDERATION
To
qualify for leave to file such a motion, a party must
demonstrate “[a] manifest failure by the Court to
consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which
were presented to the Court before such interlocutory
order.” Local Rule 7-9(b)(3). The rules are quite clear
that “[n]o motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made
by the applying party in support of or in opposition to the
interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have
reconsidered.” Local Rule 7-9(c). Parties that choose
to ignore this admonition “shall be subject to
appropriate sanctions.” Id.
Yet,
defendants do just that: they contend the order includes
legal errors and rehash the arguments raised in their moving
papers and reply briefs. In particular, defendants repeat
their argument that violation of a criminal traffic
statute in the presence of a police officer justifies vehicle
impoundment. They assert the order fundamentally misapplied
Miranda v. Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir.
2005), because that case did not involve a criminal traffic
infraction. To the contrary, defendants ignore and misapply
Miranda’s explicit holding: “A
driver’s arrest, or citation for a
non-criminal traffic violation as in this case, is not
relevant except insofar as it affects the driver’s
ability to remove the vehicle from a location at which it
jeopardizes the public safety or is at risk of loss.”
Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit made its
position on the distinction between criminal and non-criminal
statutes quite clear, albeit in dicta, but nonetheless
clearly instructive. See Sheet Metal Workers Pension
Trust of N. California v. Trayer Eng’g Corp., No.
15-CV-04234-LB, 2016 WL 1745676, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3,
2016) (“Even if it were technically dicta,
though, it expresses clearly and forcefully the Ninth
Circuit's view on the matter.”).
Defendants
also argue that it was improper to rely on the reasoning of
Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 72 F.Supp. 3d 997,
1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014), because the facts of Sandoval
and this case are different. This contention overlooks two
fundamental points. First, the order acknowledged the factual
differences between the two cases, but nevertheless found the
reasoning of the Sandoval court persuasive. Second,
the opinions of other district courts are persuasive, not
binding, and the Sandoval opinion was treated as
such. Defendants may not like the fact this court found
Sandoval’s reasoning persuasive, but such
disagreement alone is not the sort of manifest error that
warrants a motion for reconsideration.
Perhaps
more troubling is the fact defendants contend the court
manifestly failed to consider a legal argument it raised for
the first time in reply: that they could impound
Avendano-Ruiz’s car as an “instrumentality of
crime.” Defendants’ new argument was improper,
and therefore defendants’ motion would have been denied
even had they raised a dispositive legal Order Denying Leave
to File a Motion for Reconsideration and Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal argument. Despite the fact Avendano-Ruiz
has never had the opportunity to respond to this new
argument, the court read the authorities and was unpersuaded
by defendants’ argument. The analysis was not essential
to the outcome, and therefore defendants’ current
attempt to use analysis of their improper argument to unlock
a motion for reconsideration is not well taken. Accordingly,
defendants’ motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration is denied. While sanctions certainly would be
available under the applicable local rule, the court will
refrain from imposing them.
III.
CERTIFICATION FOR APPEAL
In the
alternative, defendants request an amendment to the order
authorizing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). Such a motion must conform to Local Rule 7-2,
which defendants’ motion does not, and it accordingly
will be denied without prejudice. Should defendants wish to
request certification from this court, they must file and
properly notice the motion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’
motions for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and
for certification ...